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RICHARD G. HILDRETH* and RALPH W. JOHNSON**

CZM in California, Oregon, and

Washingtont
INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago coastal zone protection was merely a gleam in the
eyes of a few west coast visionaries. A flurry of state and federal laws
in the late 1960s and into the 1970s changed this.' Today, broad coastal
management programs are in place in all three west coast states, with a
special one for San Francisco Bay. Each program is unique, and at the
same time shares significant qualities with the others. This article identifies
the major attributes of these four programs and offers insights into the
strengths and weaknesses of each.
In comparing and contrasting the four programs, this article focuses
on five topics. Four topics emphasize the process of coastal zone management: public participation, state and local government relationships,
enforcement of program requirements, and federal consistency with approved state programs. The remaining topic stresses substantive changes
in patterns of coastal resource use. 2 These five topics were selected in
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**Professor of Law, the University of Washington.
tResearch support for this article was provided by the NOAA Office of Sea Grant, Department
of Commerce, under Grant No. NA81AA-D-00086, the Lincoln Land Institute, and the University
of Washington School of Law. The authors would like to acknowledge the able research assistance
of Lasse Brautaset, Dan Conner, Meredith Getches, and Richard C. P. De Bodo.
1. Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64
(1982).
2. For a discussion on improving public access through coastal zone management, seeD. BRO\WER,
AccEss To THE NATION'S LEGAL AND PLANNING PERSPECTIVES (1978). California's program has
increased public access greatly, despite some problems with locating entities to maintain and accept
liability for access created, and a recent adverse court decision. See Pacific Legal Found. v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 128 Cal. App. 3d 695. 180 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1982). Prior to the advent of coastal
zone management, Oregon had secured public access to the large publicly-owned portions of its
relatively undeveloped coast. Washington has less public ownership of shoreline than Oregon and
less general accessibility for the public. However, Washington has not engaged in an aggressive
program to increase public access like California.
All three states are participating in the estuarine sanctuaries program authorized by section 315
of the federal Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1461 (1982) which emphasizes preservation
for education and research. To date sanctuaries have been established at South Slough, Oregon,
Padilla Bay, Washington, and Elkhorn Slough and Tijuana River, California.
Washington and Oregon are jointly planning comprehensively for future development in the lower
Columbia River estuary through the Columbia River Estuary Study Taskforce (CREST). Unlike
BCDC, however, CREST has no regulatory powers. Relevant portions of the CREST plan have
been incorporated into the plans and zoning laws of local governments along both shores of the
Columbia. The CREST effort has been supported in part by federal funds granted under section 306
of the federal Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1454 (1982).
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order to distinguish broad aspects of coastal zone management from
regulatory programs.
These topics also were chosen because of the opportunities they offer
for interstate comparison. All three states, for example, have delegated
substantial planning and implementation to coastal local governments.
Such delegation has created significant program monitoring and enforcement problems. Similarly, all four evaluated programs utilize water dependency as a principal shoreline allocation criterion. The inclusion of
water dependency also allows some preliminary attempts to link program
processes with concrete program outcomes.
For all five topics, the legal framework governing each program is
outlined and the experiences of administering the program assessed. Statutes, agency regulations, and court decisions combine to form the relevant
legal framework and provide the essentials for how coastal zone management was designed to operate. Of course, the legal framework has
been modified as experience in administration dictated. Thus, the article
also considers how particular problems actually have been dealt with in
the regulatory and planning process. Such an experiential view is, by its
very nature, difficult to portray because opinion and anecdote are, by
necessity, key elements. 3
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
The degree to which the public initiated, created, implemented, and
controlled the coastal zone management programs in all three West Coast
states is extraordinary.4
BCDC
The Bay program was initiated in 1960 by three Berkeley women. By
1965, the "Save-the-Bay Association" had attracted 18,000 members and
had mounted one of the largest letter writing and lobbying campaigns
ever launched in California's political history.5 This public support persuaded the legislature in 1965 to enact the McAteer-Petris Act,6 establishing the BCDC as a temporary state agency with a mandate to prepare
3. Testimony of Leonard Grote, Chairman, California Coastal Commission, presented before the
Assembly Committee on Energy and Natural Resources in Sacramento, California (Feb. 10, 1981).
4. The federal Coastal Zone Management Act requires public participation in state programs as
a condition of federal approval. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(3) (1982). The guidelines under the Act state
that this is "an essential element in the development and administration of a CZM Program." Coastal
Zone Management Grants, 38 Fed. Reg. 33,043, 33,048 (1973). For an analysis of the problem of
determining who constitutes the "public" and how they are identified, see Ashbaugh & Sorensen,
Identifying the "Public"forParticipationin CZM, 2 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 383 (1976).
5. See generally Baum, San FranciscoBay Conservation andDevelopment Commission, 5 LINcoLN
L. REv. 98 (1970).
6. 1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 1162.
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a longterm Bay plan by 1969, protecting the Bay in the interim against
all but the most essential fills and dredging. In 1969, active public participation was again crucial in persuading the legislature to enact the
McAteer-Petris Act (retaining the name), making the BCDC permanent
and adopting the programs recommended in the Bay Plan.7 The Bay
program has continued to receive wide public support through its implementation period. The Save-the-Bay Association continues to play a dynamic watchdog role over the BCDC, providing that agency with protection
against legislative attacks and generating public support for BCDC operations when necessary!
The California Program
Public participation was also critical in the creation and implementation
of the California program. Between 1968 and 1972 several bills were
introduced in the California Legislature to establish both a statewide
coastal management agency and a number of regional management agencies. Three of these passed in the Assembly, but were defeated in the
Senate.9 In 1971, conservationist and other organizations supporting coastal
zone management joined forces to form the California Coastal Alliance
in order to support more effective legislation to manage the coastal zone.'"
Finding itself thwarted in the legislation, the Alliance turned to the voters
and prepared Proposition 20. During the campaign in support of Proposition 20, some 700 organizations, representing widely diverse interests,
became members of the Alliance. The persuasive power of these groups
eventually overwhelmed the opposition of oil, utility, and land development interests. Proposition 20 was approved by 55 percent of the voters
in November 1972."
Proposition 20 created an interim state commission and six regional
commissions as the mechanism for California's coastal planning and
regulation.' 2 The state commission was given two primary responsibilities:
1)regulate development within the coastal zone, and 2) develop a coastal
7. Baum, supra note 5, at 109.
8. Interview with Michael B. Wilmar, Executive Director, San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Development Commission, and Russell A. Abramson, Associate Executive Director, San Francisco
Bay Conservation and Development Commission, in San Francisco (May 31, 1982).
9. See Duddleson, How the Citizens of CaliforniaSecured Their CoastalManagement Program,
in PROTECrING THE GOLDEN SHORE: LESSONS FROM THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSIONS 7-64
(R.G. Healy ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Duddleson]; F. POPPER, THE PoLmcs OF LAND USE
REFORM 84-86, 99-101 (1981).
10. S. ScOTT, GOVERNING CALIFORNIA'S COAST 13-14 (1975).
11. Id. at 2.
12. For a discussion of Proposition 20, see generally M. MOGULOF, SAVING THE COAST (1975).
See also Scott, CoastalPlanningin California:A ProgressReport, 19 PUB. AFF. REP. 1 (1978); C.
Warren & N. Dall, The California Coastal Program: A Practical Evaluation (May 1980) (unpublished
paper).
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plan for submission to the legislature. All development within the area
extending 1,000 yards inland from the shoreline to the seaward limit of
state jurisdiction three miles offshore was made subject to the permit
power of the commissions.' 3
Active citizen participation continued unabated during the hectic three
years of interim regulation and preparation of the California Coastal Plan.
Citizen supporters worked hard and effectively to assure that the members
of the Coastal Commission and the regional Conunission would support
the goals of the Act. Between 1972 and 1976 the public persisted in its
self-appointed role by seeking the election of legislators sympathetic to
the coastal management program, trying to get sympathetic legislators
appointed to key committees, and organizing to assure passage of a
permanent coastal zone law when the temporary law expired in 1976.14
The Coastal plan was completed within the time limit established by
Proposition 205 and was submitted to the legislature in December 1975.
The plan included 162 policies covering virtually every aspect of coastal
resource management, as well as recommendations for implementation.
The resulting legislative battle proved so fierce that passage of the 1976
California Coastal Act occurred only after the most intense, widely-based
lobbying by numerous citizen groups. Once again, as in the case of the
BCDC, this public support continued through the implementation period
of the Act and still persists. Literally hundreds of public hearings and
thousands of workshops were held during the preparation and certification
of the local coastal programs (LCPs) required by the Act. 16
When the regional commissions were terminated on June 30, 1981,
the ability of the public to participate effectively in the permit process
was structurally diminished. The decisionmaking forum, the state commission, is now geographically more distant from the location at issue
than were the regional commissions. Also influential in removing the
public from the commission's decisionmaking process is the change in
the manner in which state commissioners are appointed. Until the termination of the regional commissions, six of the 12 voting state commissioners were appointed by each of the regional commissions from
among their membership.' 7 Now the governor, the Senate Rules Committee, and the speaker of the assembly each appoints two of the six state
commissioners. 8 All of the commissioners are thus directly connected
13. California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 27000-27650
(West 1983).
14. ScoTT, supra note 10, at 345-52.
15. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 27230 (West 1983).
16. The city of Long Beach, for example, had an advisory committee which held 115 meetings
while formulating that city's LCP. 1979-80 CAL. COASTAL CoMM'N. BIENNIAL REPORT, at 15.
17. ScOrr, supra note 10, at 294; CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 27200 (West 1983).
18. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 30301 (West 1983).
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and then accountable to a state appointing authority. No state commissioner is insulated from the influence of a state appointing authority, as
had been the case for state commission delegates appointed by the regional
commissions.
The California Coastal Alliance has been the principal public interest
group monitoring statewide implementation of coastal zone management
in California. The smaller Save-the-Bay Association is a more cohesive
group with the single concern of protecting the Bay from filling and
dredging.' 9 Its members see the Bay daily, and can easily observe any
fills or dredging that occur. They have only one organization, the BCDC,
to monitor. By contrast, the California Coastal Alliance is composed of
several hundred less homogeneous organizations; its concerns are more
diffuse, ranging from saving farmland and providing low-income housing
to protecting against fills and providing beach access.20 Alliance members
have 1,100 miles of coastline and over 2,000 square miles of adjacent
uplands to watch over, as well as the state commission, several regional
commissions (now district offices), and numerous local governments to
monitor.
The Washington Program
The creation of the Washington Coastal Zone Management Program
(WCZMP)2 parallels California in some respects and differs in others.
The original development and public participation in that process show
many parallels with California. Bills to protect various segments of Washington's shorelines were introduced in several legislative sessions prior
to 1971.22 None of these bills passed.
Frustrated with continued legislative inaction, the Washington Environmental Council, an environmentally-oriented citizen's group, drafted
a "Shoreline Protection Act" 23 and obtained enough petition signatures
to submit the draft as Initiative Measure 43 (later 43A) to the 1971
legislature.2 4 The legislature, having the option of allowing Initiative 43
to become law automatically or enacting an alternative and submitting
both laws to the voters, chose the latter course. Two major differences
19. R. ODELL, THE SAVING OF SAN FRANCISCO BAY 5-12 (1972).
20. See Adams, Proposition20-a Citizens' Campaign, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1019 (1973).
21. WASHINGTON STATE DEP'T. OF ECOLOGY, WASHINGTON STATE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT
PRoGPAM (1976) [hereinafter cited as WASHINGTON COASTAL MANAGEMENT].
22. For insight into early attempts to pass shorelines legislation inWashington, see Shorelines
Management: The Washington Experience (June 24, 1971) (a compilation of papers presented at a
symposium in Seattle; of special relevance are the papers prepared by James M. Dolliver, then
Admin. Asst. to Gov. Evans, and Dorothy Morrell, Chairman, Saltwater Shorelines Committee,
Wash. Envtl. Council).
23. WASHINGTON SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER'S PAMPHLET 88-93 (1972).
24. For a summary of this history, see Crooks, The Washington Shoreline ManagementAct of
1971, 49 WASH. L. REV. 423 (1974).
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between these proposals were: 1) initiative 43A gave more power to the
State Department of Ecology (DOE) and less to local governments, and
2) the permit jurisdiction of Initiative 43A extended 500 feet inland from
mean high tide whereas under the legislature's version it extended inland
only 200 feet." At the November 1971 general election, the two measures
were submitted to the people. The ballot procedure allowed the electorate
first to vote for or against either system of statutory shoreline regulation,
then to express preference between them.
In urban areas, the combination of activist organizations, a preexisting
structure for land use regulation and the value of urban real estate, all
ensured that public participation in the development of the local shoreline
master programs, called for by the Act, would be intense.26 The Seattle
experience illustrated how this process worked. Five years elapsed between the initiation of work on the master program and DOE approval.27
25. Id. at 424.
26. An important difference between the California, BCDC, and Washington programs involves
the intervention of the Washington Supreme Court. In 1969, the court decided Wilbour v. Gallagher,
77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), ruling that a fill in navigable Lake Chelan must be abated
because it interfered with the public right of navigation and had never been explicitly "permitted"
by any state or local agency. The court suggested in the now-famous footnote 13 that such filling
would be allowed only if an appropriate state or local governmental agency existed at the time with
authority to issue permits for fills on Lake Chelan or for most other Washington waters.
While the applicability of this ruling to other navigable waters, especially to navigable salt waters,
was hotly debated (see Corker, Thou Shalt Not Fill Public Waters Without Public PermissionWashington'sLake ChelanDecision, 45 WASH L. REv. 65 (1970), and Rauscher, The Lake Chelan
Case-Another View, 45 WASH L. REv. 523 (1970)), the result of the doubt cast by the court was
that developers (more importantly, their banker-lenders and title insurers) stopped further filling and
development on all navigable shorelines of Washington, both salt and fresh, until some sort of permit
program could be enacted by the state legislature. Thus, both the developers and the conservationists
sought a shoreline management bill, although their ideas differed slightly about what the bill should
contain. The goals of developers, utilities, and others seeking pro-development policies for the
shorelines differed from the goals of those groups in California where they sought simply to stop
passage of any coastal management legislation. In Washington everyone agreed legislation was
necessary. The only issue was the shape of the law to be enacted.
27. Chronology of the Shoreline Master Program-City of Seattle
I. Passage of Shoreline Management Act of 1971
June 1971
2. Letter of Intent from City of DOE
1971
3. Staff set up
Sept. 1971
4. First Permit application received
Oct. 1971
5. First Permit granted
Nov. 1971
6. Work on SMP began
Oct. 1971
7. Citizens' Advisory Committee appointed
Mar. 1973
8. First meeting Citizens' Advisory Committee
Apr. 1973
9. Inventory of Shorelines completed
Apr. 1973
10. First Draft of SMP published
Jan. 1974
11. Planning Commission hearing, draft review
Mar. 1974
12. Draft 2 published
June 1974
13. Citizens' Advisory Committee review
July 1974
14. Draft 3 published
July 1974
15. Citizen review meetings
July-Aug. 1974
16. Draft 4 published
Sept. 1974

January 1985)

CZM IN CALIFORNIA

In the course of those five years, program development required the city
to spend approximately $200,000, hold more than 100 public meetings,
and prepare five separate drafts.28 Widespread citizen opposition to various
provisions in these drafts caused formation of the Seattle Shorelines Coalition which is made up of members of eight Community Councils with
shoreline frontage.
Metropolitan areas also received serious efforts and extensive participation by the citizen committees. In Whatcom County, south of the Canadian border, a citizens' advisory committee which drew up the local
master program met over a period of two years.29 The committee held
about 50 meetings in full committee and approximately 55 subcommittee
meetings, as well as 20 to 25 group presentations. In addition, planning
commission hearings, work sessions, and county commissioners' hearings
and work sessions were held.3"
The Oregon Program
Citizen participation in Oregon's coastal management program has
perhaps been less dramatic than in neighboring states where, in some
cases, a citizen's crusade was mounted against the opposition of special
interests and the recalcitrance or neglect of public officials. The development of Oregon's program has been quieter and less confrontational
because the impetus came primarily from the partnership of a farsighted
governor, a few conscientious legislators, and management specialists,
all of whom were often in advance of local environmentalists. The pro17. Planning Commission review approval
Sept. 1974
18. Transmittal to City Council
Sept. 1974
19. First Council hearing on SMP
Nov. 1974
20. Council meetings
Dec. 1974-Sept. 1975
21. Central Waterfront Task Force established
Aug. 1975
22. Central Waterfront Task Force meets
Sept.-Oct. 1975
23. Draft 5 published
Oct. 1975
24. Council considers Draft 5
Nov. 1975-Mar. 1976
25. Council adopts SMP by resolution
Mar. 1976
26. Transmittal of SMP to DOE
1 Apr. 1976
27. DOE partial approval
30 June 1976
28. DOE partial approval
8 Oct. 1976
29. Joint Planning Commission/Council hearing
12 Dec. 1976
30. Planning Commission approves SMP
16 Jan. 1977
31. Council approves SMP
10 Feb. 1977
32. Mayor signs ordinance
14 Feb. 1977
33. Ordinance takes effect
16 Mar. 1977
28. Interview with John Miller, Seattle City Councilman, in Seattle, Washington (Jan. 17, 1978).
29. See testimony of Phyllis Graham, former chairperson, Citizens Advisory Committee, at
Department of Ecology, public hearing on amendments to Whatcom County Shoreline Master Program (Oct. 7, 1981).
30. Id.
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gram may, in fact, be sturdier because of its reliance on quiet negotiation
and compromise.
Encouraged by the success and far reaching effects of Oregon's Beach
Bill of 1967, which preserved public access to all ocean beaches in the
state, 3' together with the national publicity generated by the successful
cleanup of polluted portions of the Willamette River in the late 1960s,
Oregon's legislators and its governor took the initiative in promoting a
coastal management program.32 In 1969, the legislature enacted Senate
Bill 10 which required all cities and counties in the state to develop
comprehensive plans in compliance with statewide standards.33 Major
portions of Senate Bill 10 were referred to the voters in 1970, and by a
margin of three to two Oregon citizens affirmed the desirability of planned
development.
Senate Bill 10 provided for the formation of a study commission, the
Oregon Coastal Conservation and Development Commission (OCCDC),34
which convened in 1971 to make an inventory of the coast's resources
and to develop a model management plan. The 30-member commission,
consisting of public officials and private citizens appointed by the governor, was charged with the duty of submitting by January 17, 1975, a
"proposed comprehensive plan for the preservation and development of
natural resources of the coastal zone." 35
An important feature of OCCDC's agenda, as announced in 1973, was
its "public involvement program." Planning to encourage a "wide variety
of public and private interests to participate in reviewing, responding,
and selecting alternative management policies and standards for coastal
resources," the commission announced its intention to carry36out its tasks
by planning with people, rather than planning for people."
Accordingly, the commission organized over 20 workshops to which
all interested parties were invited. More than 1,000 persons ultimately
attended. At each workshop, care was taken to solicit comments and
proposals, and to have every participant's contribution taken down.3 The
31. OR. REv. STAT. §§390.605-.690 (1983).
32. In 1970, Governor McCall issued Executive Order 07-070-07 which stopped all state involvement in development projects which would alter the coastal environment. The Governor said
that the moratorium was motivated by his belief that CZM legislation would soon exist at both state
and federal levels. See Levison & Hess, Conservation andDevelopment in Oregon's CoastalZone,
4 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 97, 115 n.24 (1978).
33. OR. REv. STAT. §§215.505-.535 (1971) (repealed 1977).
34. See 1971 Or. Laws 6.
35. OR. REv. STAT. § 191.140 (1971) (repealed 1977).
36. OREGON COASTAL CONSERVATION AND DEv. COMM'N. INTERiM REP. 14-15 (1973).
37. After all workshops had been completed, the OCCDC staff published a 43-page compilation,
Synopsis of Public Workshops and Main Concerns of Valley Workshops. Included were hundreds
of ideas about how to manage coastal resources. Attempting to present faithfully the concerns and
recommendations expressed at each workshop, the staff organized the contributions into categories:
estuaries and wetlands, beaches and dunes, shorelands and uplands, historical and archaeological
resources, and so on.
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commission then appointed resource specialist teams to recommend appropriate policies for each category. Nine teams were established; members were chosen from governmental agencies, universities, and business
and industry. No one was paid for his or her contribution, and the commissioners themselves served without salary.
In the meantime, several years after Oregon began to consider comprehensive planning for the management of coastal resources, the federal
CZMA was enacted. Fortunately, federal funds became available under
the CZMA38 just as Oregon was preparing its own management program
for the coast because by 1973 the flaws in Oregon's Senate Bill 10 were
apparent. Lacking provisions for coordination, financial and technical
assistance, or enforcement, the Bill was, in effect, toothless. The state
legislature, as a result, enacted Senate Bill 100, a far more complete land
use bill which corrected the shortcomings of its predecessor and was
designed for compliance with the federal CZMA of the previous year.39
More formally called the Oregon Land Use Act,4" Senate Bill 100 created
the Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC), together
with its administrative arm, the Department of Land Conservation and
Development. 4
In 1974, LCDC conducted more than 88 workshops and public hearings
throughout the state in order to enlist citizen participation for policy
formation. In December of that same year, the Commission formally
adopted 14 "Goals" '4 2 and the following year a further Goal concerning
the Willamette River Greenway was added.43 Consideration of the coastal
zone was purposely delayed to await completion of the Oregon Coastal
Conservation and Development Commission (OCCDC) report.'
In 1975, OCCDC published its recommendations, presented its findings
38. 16 U.S.C.

39.

§1454

(1982).

OR. REv. STAT. 88 197.005-.795 (1983).

40. Id.
41. The Act charged LCDC with performing the following functions:
-identifying geographical areas of particular concern;
-formulating a list of statewide standards (called "Goals") which would serve as a
legally binding model for the development of local comprehensive plans;
-in general, establishing state policy for resource management;
-coordinating local planning efforts;
-ensuring opportunity for citizen involvement;
-providing financial and technical assistance and administering federal funds;
-resolving appeals, conflicts, and inconsistencies as an alternative to seeking redress

from the courts; and
-reviewing the comprehensive plans of local jurisdictions and approving them if they
are found to conform with statewide Goals and statutes.
42. OREGON LAND CONSERVATION AND DEv. COMM'N. STATE-WIDE PLANNING GOALS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE COASTAL ZONE (1976) [hereinafter cited as STATE-WIDE PLANNING GOALS].

43. E.g., OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, EVALUATION FINDINGS FOR THE OREGON COASTAL
ZONE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR THE PERIOD FROM FEBRUARY 1981 TO FEBRUARY 1982 2 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as 1982 EVALUATION FINDINGS]; see also OR. REv. STAT. 88 390.310-.368 (1983).
44. See generally Levinson & Hess, supra note 32.
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to the legislature and to LCDC, and then disbanded.45 The legislature
took no action, but LCDC scheduled further hearings on OCCDC's recommendations and established technical advisory committees to make
further recommendations. In February 1976, LCDC published the revision
of OCCDC's policies for public review.4 6 The following month, staff
members conducted 20 public hearings on the revised policies. An estimated 1,400 persons attended. In June, a further revision was issued,
and in September and October of 1976 the LCDC staff conducted more
than 100 meetings in coastal communities. After 12 additional public
hearings in November and December the policies took final form and
were adopted on December 18, 1976 as the coastal goals.47 The adoption
of Oregon's coastal goals was, thus, the result of innumerable man-hours
spent in public meetings. To an unprecedented degree, in Oregon, the
public was involved in the formulation of the coastal goals. The following
year Oregon's Coastal Management Program was approved as fulfilling
all the CZMA's requirements by the Office of Coastal Zone Management
of the United States Department of Commerce.48
The 15 statewide land use planning goals and the four coastal goals
together represent a consensus of what participating Oregonians think
should be included in local comprehensive plans. The goals reflect the
values which a majority of Oregon voters have reconfirmed three times.
Three times since its adoption, essential portions of Oregon's land use
program have been challenged by initiative petition. In 1976, Oregon
voters reaffirmed their support of the state's planning program by a margin
of 57 to 43 percent, and in 1978 the voters approved the program by an
even greater margin, 60 to 39 percent. Yet another challenge appeared
on the November 1982 ballot and was defeated 53 to 47 percent.
Conclusion
Almost inevitably, the high levels of public participation in the enactment and initial implementation of all four programs diminished as the
programs matured and became more decentralized. Especially in California, the termination of the regional commissions greatly increased the
costs of public participation in the coastal commission process.
45. The functions of OCCDC have in part been taken over by the Oregon Coastal Zone Management Association, Inc. (OCZMA), a voluntary association of local governments and special
districts which now operates independently of any state or federal charter.
46. OREGON LAND CONSERVATION AND DEv. COMM'N. DRAFr LAND USE PLANNING GOALS AND
GuIDELINEs FOR THE COASTAL ZONE (1976).
47. OREGON LAND CONSERVATION AND DEV. COMM'N. STATEWIDE PLANNING GOALS AND GuI-

DELINES 16, 17, 18, AND 19 FOR COASTAL REsouRcEs (1977). After several months of extensive
review and comment, the first amendments to the four coastal goals were approved by LCDC in
October 1984. All were relatively minor in nature.
48. 1982 EVALUATION FINDINGS, supra note 43, at 1.
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STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIPS
Introduction
All four programs-BCDC, California, Washington, and Oregonwere spurred by strong feelings of distrust of local government and dissatisfaction with past performance on land use control in the coastal
zone."9 Proponents of coastal zone programs leveled sharp criticisms at
local governments. Local governments, for example, were seen as pushovers for developers."0 Often these governments provided no special protection to beaches, views, access ways, or other valuable coastal resources.
Instead, local officials seemed overly interested in enhancing tax bases.
These governments had no institutional responsibility to consider regional, statewide, or national public interests. Their limited jurisdictional
base created disincentives for coordinated planning and zoning programs
with neighboring jurisdictions.
Cumulative impacts of fills, dredging, and other modifications of the
shoreline were frequently ignored. Local governments were often themselves at fault because of the adverse impact of government projects such
5
as jetties, bulkheads, sewage control, and energy facilities. Around San
Francisco Bay, for example, ports and airports competed with each other.
Each sought to expand with still more filling of the Bay, even though
many thought that the region needed no new port or airport.
In all three states, local governments actively opposed legislation creating coastal zone programs-a predictable reaction because each was
designed to invade the traditional turf of local governments. Local governments correctly viewed such programs as attacks on their past performance and as undisguised attempts to force change in the way coastal
resources were managed.5 2 Local officials who wanted to protect their
49. See,e.g., S. ScoTT, supra note 10, at 6-7; The CaliforniaCoastal Commission:At the Crossroads, series of articles reprinted from the Los Angeles Times, from issues published Sunday, May
10, 1981 to Monday, May 19, 1981.
50. See, e.g., Zile, A Legislative-PoliticalHistory of the CoastalZone ManagementAct of 1972,
1 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 235, 236 (1974).
51. See generally ODELL, supra note 19; MEL Scowr, THE FuTURE OF SAN FRANciscO BAY (1963);
S. ScoTr, supra note 10; Baum, supra note 5; Crooks, supra note 24; The California Coastal
Commission:At the Crossroads,supranote 49; ShorelinesManagement:The WashingtonExperience,
Proceedings of a Symposium in Seattle, Washington (June 24, 1972); Interview with Michael B.
Wilmar, Executive Director, San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, and
Russell A. Abramson, Associate Director, San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, in San Francisco, California (May 31, 1982); and Interviews with Charles Roe, Assistant
Attorney General for Department of Ecology, in Olympia, Washington (Sept. 9, 1973, Jan. 6, 1975
& Oct. 12, 1978).
52. See generally S. ScowT, supranote 10;The CaliforniaCoastalCommission at the Crossroads,
supra note 49; Personal experience of co-author, R. Johnson, as a member of a special legislative
Task Force to draft compromise Washington Shoreline Management Act (Feb. 1971) (for a description
of the Task Force, see Shoreline Management: The Washington Experience, Proceedings of a Symposium in Seattle, Washington 37 (June 24, 1972).
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power base provided some of the most intense lobbying against the coastal
programs during the legislative process. In addition, they wanted to assure
(and were reasonably successful in doing so) that any loss of local governmental power would be temporary. 3
BCDC
BCDC was created to operate entirely outside the existing local government structure. Some 32 cities and nine counties were located on the
water around San Francisco Bay. Under their "Balkanized" management,
the Bay was filled to an extent that it was reduced in surface area from
680 square miles in the 1850s to about 430 square miles in 1960."4 A
1959 Corps of Engineers report entitled FutureDevelopment of the S.F.
BayArea 1960-2020 concluded that by 1990 much of the Bay's remaining
marshland would probably be "reclaimed." The report forecasted that by
the year 2020 there would be almost continuous development throughout
the nine bay counties and that some 325 square miles of the Bay were
"susceptible of reclamation." If the rate of reclamation55 were allowed
to continue, the Bay "would be reduced to a channel in less than 100
years." 5 6
Thus, BCDC was a natural outgrowth of the need to create and implement a comprehensive Baywide plan. It might have been possible,
once the Plan was adopted, to turn implementation over to the existing
local governments, either with or without the supervision of BCDC. That
option, however, was never seriously considered. Few were convinced
that the local governments could successfully resist pressures to fill the
Bay further.57 Such action would have forced the Save-the-Bay Association to play a watchdog role over some 41 different city and county
governments, and would have rendered future attempts to update the Bay
plan more difficult.
The 1969 conversion from a temporary to a permanent Bay commission
strengthened the representation of local governments. 8 These changes
altered neither the basic purposes nor the effective implementation of the
Bay plan. Apparently the simplicity of BCDC's goals and the broad,
53. See CAL.PuB. Ras. CODE §§ 30500, 30519(a) (West 1983) (providing for the return of authority
to local governments).
54. See ODELL, supra note 19, at 8; Baum, supra note 5, at 102.
55. The rate of reclamation was 3.6 square miles per year in the period 1940-1958.
56. ODELL, supra note 19, at 11.
57. See ODELL, supra note 19, at 8; Baum, supra note 5, at 99.
58. The total number of commissioners remained the same, at twenty-seven. However, one change
required that each of the nine county representatives be a supervisor elected from a district including
Bay lands, instead of someone appointed by the Board Supervisors, who might or might not be a
supervisor himself. Also, each of the four Association of Bay Area Governments' appointees must
be an elected city representative. See San FranciscoBay Plan July 1979, BCDC 33.
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continuing consensus that exists in the Bay Area for the achievement of
those goals assured their passage.
The CaliforniaProgram
Distrust of local government was also apparent in the drive to enact a
California coastal zone management program. Prior to Proposition 20,
the coast was under the fragmented management of 15 counties, 45 cities,
42 state units, and 70 federal agencies. 59 Attempts had been made since
the 1930s to bring rational, comprehensive planning to the California
coast. The long list of environmental evils which had befallen the coast
included wetlands filling, loss of beachs and beach access, loss of views,
excessive development, improper zoning, and unnecessary duplication
of facilities. Local governments on the coast suffered from the same
institutional and jurisdictional limitations which impaired the sound management of San Francisco Bay.' ° No single plan or statement of management policies existed for the state's costal zone.
Under Proposition 20, substantial authority was taken away from local
governments and state agencies and was given, instead, to the new Coastal
Commission and six regional commissions.6" The regional commissions
were empowered to grant, modify, or deny applications for development
permits, and to aid in preparing the coastal plan. The state commission
was given authority to decide appeals from permit decisions of the regional
commissions and to make the final decisions on statewide policies in the
plan. Local governments played no direct role in the management scheme
at this
point, except through the selection of some regional commission62
ers.
Had the interim system established by Proposition 20 terminated on
January 1, 1977, as the proposition provided, local governments would
59. Douglas, CoastalZone Management-A NewApproach in California, 1 COASTAL ZONE Morr.
J. 1 (1973); see also Scotr, supra note 10, at 7.
60. Adams, supra note 20, at 1022-23.
61. See generally Sabatier, State Review of Local Land Use Decisions: The California Coastal
Commissions, 3 COASTAL ZONE MoMT.J. 255 (1977).
62. Of the 12 state commission members, 6 were appointed by the governor and leaders
of the state Senate and Assembly to represent the public at large (each could choose
2 commissioners). The other 6 were selected by each of the 6 regional commissions
from its membership. The regional commissions ranged from 12 to 16 members evenly
divided between elected local officials (city council members or county supervisors
selected by the local governments of each region) and public members (again apppointed
by the governor and leaders of the Assembly and Senate). Throughout the "Proposition
20" years, most regional commissioners chose one of their public members, rather
than one of their local government members, to represent them on the state commission.
Thus, policy and decisionmaking for the entire process was directed by private citizens
and elected representatives of local governments, all serving part time, rather than by
salaried state employees.
Duddleson, supra note 9, at 16.
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have regained management authority over coastal development. Alternatively, the legislature could have formally adopted the 1975 Coastal
Plan as the state's coastal policy and mandated that local governments
proceed with implementation. The California Coastal Act of 1976, however, established a more elaborate process.63 Instead, the Act delegated
general coastal management responsibility to local government and ports.'
The 1976 Coastal Act also narrowed the coastal commissions' permit
authority, immediately giving local governmental bodies the power to
approve certain types of development. Improvements to single-family
residences, maintenance dredging, repair of maintenance activities, development in built-up areas, and replacement of structures destroyed by
natural
disaster were exempt from the coastal commission permit pro65
cess.
As part of the legislative plan to return power to local governments,
the regional commissions terminated on June 30, 1981.66 Since that date,
regions have been represented on the state commission by local officials,
nominated by local governments and appointed by the governor, the
Senate Rules Committee, and assembly speaker.67 This selection process
is intended to assure that commission members have a statewide perspective on coastal zone management.
The 1976 Coastal Act prescribed in detail the method by which local
governments and ports would resume mangement responsibility. Chapter
6 of the Act mandates that each local government within the coastal zone
prepare a "Local Coastal Program (LCP), ' 6' The LCP consists of the
local government's land use plans, zoning ordinances and maps, and
other implementing measures which combine to form the local expression
of Coastal Act policies and implementation strategies.69 Once an LCP is
certified by the commission,7" permit authority for new development is
delegated to the local government.' LCP certification is the final step in
California's delegation of ultimate coastal management responsibility to
local government.
63. Also enacted in 1976 were the Nejedly-Hart State, Urban, and Coastal Bond Act, CAL. PuB.
REs. CODE §§ 5096.111-. 139 (West 1983), and the California Coastal Conservancy Act, CAL. PuB.
Ras. CODE §§31000-31406 (West 1983).
64. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 30519 (West 1983).
65. Id. §30610(a)-(g).
66. Originally the regional commissions were to terminate in 1979 but were extended until 1981
when local planning proceeded more slowly than expected.
67. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 30301 (West 1983)
68. Id. § 30500(a).
69. Id. § 30108.6.
70. Until the termination of the regional commissions on July 1, 1981, the LCP certification
process included review by the appropriate regional commission prior to the LCP going to the state
commission for certification. For a brief descriptiion of LCP submittal and certification procedure,
see CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 30510-30522 (West 1983).
71. Id. § 30519(a).
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Chapter 8 of the 1976 Coastal Act treated port districts in essentially
the same manner as it did coastal cities and counties.7 2 The four established
port districts, Hueneme, Long Beach, Los Angeles, and San Diego, were
required to prepare master plans. The four port districts have completed
their master plans and are issuing development permits. Before the master
plans were certified, developments within the port districts were reviewed
by the coastal commissions in the same manner as developments within
coastal cities and counties. 3
On the other hand, as of October 1983, only 30 LCPs had been certified
and another 72 local governments had completed the land use portion of
the LCP.74 Thus, in the seven years since the 1976 Coastal Act became
effective, approximately one-quarter of the coastal local governments had
completed the process. The Coastal Act originally called for submittal of
LCPs by January 1, 1981. During the 1978-79 session of the legislature
this date was extended to January 1, 1983."5 Thus, the delegation process
appears to be far behind schedule. Local governments played no direct
role in the creation of the 1975 California Coastal Plan. Under the 1976
Act local governments were required to develop LCPs under the close
supervision of the regional and state commissions and in accordance with
policies imposed upon them.7 6 The only sanction for failure to prepare
an LCP was possible state commission staff intervention in the planning
process. Furthermore, as local governments received approval of their
LCPs, they assumed responsibility for permit granting. Power was thus
returned to the local level, but new administrative burdens and new costs
were imposed at a time of diminishing revenues. Finally, local governments with approved LCPs are exposed directly to the hostility of local
developers whose permit requests have been denied based on state-decreed
coastal zone policies.
Reviewing the progress of California coastal planning in 1979, the
California Assembly Office of Research cited a lack of clear direction
from commission staffs to local planners, a lack of coordination between
the state and regional staffs, and funding problems as important causes
of delay.77 This assessment noted that "the initiative for preparation of
the LCPs rests with local governments in the coastal zone, and the com-

72. Id. §§30700-30721.
73. Id. §§30700, 30714.
74. Telephone Interview with Paul Thayer, Legislative Coordinator, California Coastal Commission (Oct. 25, 1984).
75. See CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 30501(b) (West 1977) repealedby 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 1173. Section
30517.5 now specified January 1, 1983, as the final date for LCP submittal.
76. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 30500(c) (West 1983).
77. CAL. ASSEMBLY OFFIcE OF RESEARCH, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL PLANNING
PRocEsS 27 (Feb. 1979) {hereinafter cited as ASSESSMENT]I
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mission has78 no authority to compel them to accelerate their planning
programs.
In some cases, members of local government have been unwilling
participants either because they do not like the coastal Act 79 or because
they view state agencies as adversaries."0 Some jurisdictions, in addition,
lack sufficiently competent staff to handle the complex and innovative
planning effort.8"
Funding has also been a significant problem. Local planners and officials frequently complain of inadequate funds to meet the tasks of LCP
developments. 2 The LCP process requires background information to
which local governments have not had ready access. The state commission, through its staff and LCP manual, has required the undertaking of
special studies and has imposed formidable new data gathering and analysis requirements. Some conscientious and competent local planners have
found the funding inadequate to pay for the work that should be done. 3
On occasion, however, recalcitrant or incompetent planners have used
the shortfall between state LCP grants and local expenditures either as a
bargaining chip in program approval or as an excuse for delay or inadequate LCP preparation.'
Communication between regional and state commission staffs and between commission and local staffs has been problematic at times. Frequently, in the early years of LCP development, communication difficulties
caused long delays.8 5 Local government staffs are familiar with such
difficulties. It was not unusual in the early years for locals to get caught
in the "crossfire." 8 6 One outcome was that many chores had to be duplicated--once to satisfy regional demands, and a second time to please
state personnel. Indeed, such discrepancies between regional and state
commissions have been a nagging problem during review of local land
use plans.8 7
78.
79.
Local
80.

Id. at 30.
E.g. Southern California Ass'n. of Gov'ts, A Background and Status Report on the State/
Coastal Programs 4 (Aug. 1980).
Sorensen, Definitions and Development in the CollaborativePlanning, in COASTAL MANAGEMENT: READINGS AND NOTES 247 (M. Hershman 2d ed. 1981). See also Meridith A. Getches, The
LCP: Saving the Baby, Discarding the Bathwater 1 (1979) (a paper prepared for the Conference of
Coastal Commissioners at Asilomar, California, March 15 & 16, 1979).
81. Getches. supra note 80, at 1.
82. AssSSMErNT, supra note 77, at 32. See also CoastalPlanningIssues: A Consensus Report,
in COASTAL CONSERVATION: ESSAYS ON EXPERIMENTs IN GOVERNANCE 6 (S.Scott ed. 1981).
83. Comment reflects the authors' experience.
84. Id.
85. Scott, Notes on California'sCoastal Governance: A Reply to Peter Douglas, in COASTAL
CONSERVATION: ESSAYS ON ExPERIWm.NTS IN GOVERNANCE 6 (S.Scott ed. 1981).
86. According to a former LCP planner, all too frequently those policies/plans which regional
staff assessed as adequate were found totally wanting by state commission personnel.
87. The County of Santa Barbara, after many months of negotiations and revision, produced a
land use plan that the regional staff deemed generally satisfactory and likely to get approval by the
regional commission. As the plan was about to enter the hearing process, state staff issued a lengthy
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Communication between commission and local staffs has also been
less than ideal.8 8 Permit processing had been a major commission function
under Proposition 20.89 The degree of detail and specificity required for
that process often was not available, or was felt by many to be inappropriate for the LCP process." °
Previously, state-mandated general plan documents had routinely been
purposefully vague in order to provide flexibility for local governments
to approve a broad range of developments without actually violating their
planning goals. 9' The LCP demanded a great deal more specificity than
previous planning documents. Local planners feared that the flexibility
of the planning process would be lost if too much detail were required.9 2
Also, there was fear that too much specificity in the LCP about the nature
and intensity of desired future development would prevent local government from taking advantage of lucrative, unforeseen, and non-conforming
development proposals.93
Prior local planning efforts had not required as much information or
had been firmly rooted in policies based upon environmental constraints.94
Some planners have outright disrespect for data and no experience or
appreciation for policy-planning. The technical information necessary
to form the bases for the LCP has been available to few, if any, local
plaming departments. In most cases, the costs of gathering information,
expertise, and analysis have been too great for the available funding.96
Local planners have, instead, looked to the commission for technical
information. In each of its annual evaluations of California's management
program, the federal Office of Coastal Zone Management (OCZM) has
urged the commission to improve local technical assistance.97
critique which pointed to dozens of areas they considered inadequate. Had these problems been
worked out during the regional negotiations, much time and effort could have been conserved.
88. Scott, Coastal Planning in California:A ProgressReport, 19 PUB. ApF. REP. 1, 3 (1978).
89. Id.
90. See supra note 81. For a discussion of the problems with specificity, see supra notes 76 and
79.
91. See generally Sorensen, supra note 80, at 247-56.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. One experienced planner said that, previously, the Coastal Act planners were used to doing
sloppy planning and the LCP process was getting local planning "out of the dark ages." Scott, supra
note 12, at 7.
95. Comment reflects a former LCP planner's experience with local planners.
96. See supra notes 76, 79, and 81.
97. U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOsPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE
OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, EVALUATION FINDINGS FOR THE PERIOD FROM SETEMBER TO
NOVEMBER 1981 (Mar. 14, 1981); U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL OCEAic AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, EVALUATION FINDINGS FOR THE CALIF-

1980 (Dec.
12, 1980); NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMNISTRATION, OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANORNIA COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY TO SEPTEMBER

AGEMENT, U.S. DEFT. OF COMMERCE, SECTION 312 EVALUATION FINDINGS, THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL
ZONE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR 1976-1979.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

The Coastal Act requires that the commission and the local governments
act as partners in coastal planning.98 The LCP process goes beyond any
previous planning endeavor in California in requiring such cooperation.
Local reactions regarding the issue of "home rule v. state mandate" have
greatly undermined the cooperative ideal of the LCP "collaborative planning" process. For collaborative planning to work well, or even to work
at all, those sharing authority and responsibility must participate, be
willing to negotiate, and be willing to make tradeoffs.99 Many local
governments have been unwilling to deal with the LCP with a cooperative
attitude because LCP is a state-mandated program."o
All these elements could influence the effectiveness of LCPs after they
are certified, and local governments are delegated management responsibility.10' It is too soon to evaluate the impact of certified LCPs or the
importance of any or all of these elements in implementation of the LCPs.
The following prediction may be a realistic one:
[A] city or county pursuing an opposition (or benign neglect) strategy
will simply have to take care not to appear too flagrant in its use of
various means available to circumvent its certified program-means
such as variances, conditional uses, planned unit development, perfunctory review of permit applications and post construction conditions, and ignoring violations.0 2
The Washington Program
Initiative 43 was evidence of strong public hostility toward local government's stewardship of the coastal zone. The proposed Shoreline Protection Act would have turned over virtually complete control of the state's
shorelines to the new Department of Ecology (DOE). Local governments
understandably opposed this approach when it was considered by the
legislature. Their opposition was emboldened by doubts--even by some
of the more ardent critics of local governments-about whether an untried
and, as yet, unstaffed state agency would ultimately do a better job
managing the coastal zone. Local governments, at least, had existing
staffs and a long history of involvement with land use planning, zoning,
and permit processing.
The general dissatisfaction with local government's performance was
reflected in the wide support given Initiative 43, the strong voter approval
of Alternative 43B, the Shoreline Mangement Act (SMA), and the SMA
98. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §30500(c) (West 1983).
99. Sorensen, supra note 80, at 253.
100. Zanic, California Coastal Planning: A Look at an Experiment in Process, in COASTAL
CONSERVATION: ESSAYS ON EXPERIMENTS IN GOVERNANCE 47 (S. Scott ed. 1981); Getches, supra
note 80 at 1.
101. Zanic, supra note 100, at 47.
102. Sorensen, supra note 80, at 263.
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requirement that local governments prepare shoreline master programs
under the supervision and guidance of the state Department of Ecology.
In addition, local coastal zone governments gave a new state agency, the
Shorelines Hearing Board (SHB), appellate jurisdiction over permit pro-

cessing.

°3

The Washington Shoreline Management Act did not, as in California,
create a new state coastal commission. Instead, it bestowed implementing
authority on an established agency of state government, the Department
of Ecology, which was created in 1970."
The Washington State coastal plan was devised through a process
entirely different from California's. In Washington, the SMA made a
roughzoning of the state's shorelines, classifying some as "shorelines of
statewide significance," over which the state DOE has strong supervisory
authority. The balance was classed as "shorelines" over which local
governments were given greater control. 0"
The more detailed zoning of Washington's shorelines was left to the
local shoreline master programs, created over the five years between
1974-1979 under SMA policies and DOE guidelines." ° By June 1981,
all 15 coastal counties and 36 of 38 coastal municipalities had DOEapproved master programs. With these local programs in place, the Washington State coastal management plan came into existence.
The Washington process apparently paid greater deference to the regular
state and local government structure than did the California plan. 0 7 At
the same time, the Washington approach produced a greater risk of lack
103. WASH, REV. CODE § 90.58.170 (1983).

104. Id. §90.58.050.
105. Id. §§ 90.59.030, 90.58.090.
106. Id. § 90.58.030(2)(f). The master programs were essentially comprehensive land use plans
for the shoreline area. When master programs were submitted for approval, the DOE could require
the local governments to redraft sections not conforming to the policies of the SMA. If the local
effort regarding SSwS was unsatisfctory the DOE could prepare the master program.
Whenever possible a master program was to contain seven elements: economic development,
public access, recreation, transportation, use, conservation, and cultural values. In order to facilitate
the proper location of the above elements, each jurisdiction's shorelines were to be classified within
four broad categories of shoreline environment. The objective was to encourage uses within each
type of environment that were compatible with its characteristics. The four "umbrella" environments
were: natural, conservancy, rural, and urban. The shoreline needs of Washington's ports are supposed
to be accounted for in the relevant local shoreline master programs, but there is some question
whether this has in fact occurred.
107. For an exceptionally thoughtful and carefully researched evaluation of the Washington shoreline management program up to 1977, see McCrea & Feldman, Interim Assessment of Washington
State Shoreline Management, 3 COASTAL ZONE MNrr. J. 119 (1977). These authors concluded that
since passage of the 1971 Shoreline Management Act, the State had carried on a vigorous shoreline
program, but that there were persistent problems of inadequate information bases for local master
programs. They also noted that public access had increased only minimally, that the water dependency
requirement for overwater construction had not been implemented as strongly as many had hoped,
and that exemptions from the Act (especially for single family residences) detracted from the overall
effectiveness of the program.
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of coordination among the different local programs because of their sera preexisting overall plan, such as the plan which
iatum approval without
10 8
existed in California.
Some early commentators were skeptical of Washington local governments' ability to manage shorelines adequately through the master program process. In some ways, environmentalists' fears of local government
appeasement of developers have been realized. An example is the CBI
case.
In Whatcom County, the Chicago Bridge and Iron Company (CBI)
proposed development of a construction site for oil drilling rigs. The
plans called for a 28-acre landfill. The selected site was classified "conservancy," and was, therefore, incompatible with the project. The county
supervisors approved 15 amendments to the county master program. One
amendment would have reclassified the "conservancy" environment to
"urban," thus accommodating the project. Without the supervisory role
of the DOE, the project would have been approved.
The DOE played an active role by rejecting the amendments. The
county did not challenge the DOE's decision, but CBI tried another
strategy. A CBI-sponsored bill, which would have created a new shoreline
zone, passed the legislature. This zone would have been entitled "shorelines of statewide economic significance,"'" and the bill would have
effectively approved the CBI site for development. "0 Within such a shoreline zone, economic considerations would have been given priority over
environmental concerns."' The legislation would have left classification
of such zones entirely to local governments and eliminated all review by
the DOE and SHB."'
Passage of the legislation would have dealt a severe blow both to the
SMA and the Washington Coastal Management Program. Governor Spellman, however, vetoed it." 3 Nevertheless, the ease with which the bill
108. Recognition of this problem has inspired at least four regional studies in recent years, designed
to provide a coordinated approach to several larger coastal areas. See Sorensen, supra note 80, at
5-75.
109. S.B. 4832, §2f, 1982 Washington State Legislative Session.
110. Id. §6.
111. Id.
112. Id. §§4, 6.
113. One of the grounds for Governor Spellman's veto was:
[This law.., would seriously jeopardize the state's status under the Federal CZMA
Act. It would ... likely result in the loss of federal dollars for the act, and more
importantly of authority of the state to proceed in a couple of areas. One area being
that of federal consistency with state shoreline management plans. As this [Washington] Shoreline management plan becomes discredited, in effect becomes inoperable, then there is no longer any federal necessity for consistency.
Gov. John Spellman, statement at Press Conference on Veto of SB 4831 of the 1982 Washington
State Legislative Session (Apr. 3, 1982).
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passed the legislature provides still another illustration of how economic
development is once again beginning to take priority over environmental
concerns.
The Oregon Program
The cornerstone of Oregon's coastal mangement program is the local
comprehensive plan." 4 Every coastal city and county is required to adopt
a plan consistent with four coastal "Goals" promulgated by the LCDC.
The LCDC is also charged with oversight and administration of Oregon's
coastal program until the local plans are "acknowledged." The four coastal
goals, adopted in December 1976, relate to the management of estuaries,
shorelands, beaches and dunes, and ocean resources. Every coastal jurisdiction must incorporate and implement its provisions in its local comprehensive plan. "' A further requirement mandates that ports and special
districts be incorporated into the relevant county or city plan, but local
governments, ports and special districts have been dilatory in coordination
with each other.
LCDC is charged with reviewing local comprehensive plans and deciding whether the plan is consistent or inconsistent with the goals. When
LCDC approves a plan, that plan takes on the force of law and supersedes
the goals. Prior to LCDC approval, every local jurisdiction's land use
actions are subject to LCDC review for compliance with the goals.
The preparation of local comprehensive plans has been fraught with
difficulties and controversy in Oregon. When the four coastal goals were
adopted and promulgated, virtually no one suspected that the development
and approval of coastal management plans would take the better part of
a decade. Although coastal plans in Oregon are part of a more general
land use plan which must meet the standards of 14 or 15 additional
goals,' 6 the coastal goals are generally much more detailed than the other
goals and harder to implement fully. At least one coastal county' " had
the land use portion of its comprehensive plan ready for years. Approval
has been delayed only by the difficulty of meeting and implementing the
coastal goals.
As of October 1984, only 29 of the comprehensive plans for Oregon's
41 coastal jurisdictions have been approved." 8 While all of the coastal
county plans have now been approved, several local plans have not been
114. See Levinston & Hess, supra note 32.
115. OR. Rnv. STAT. § 197.255 (1983).
116. See Fussner & Wiley, Oregon'sNew State Land Use PlanningAct-Two Views, 54 OR. L.
REv. 203 (1975); MacPherson & Paulus, Senate Bill 100: The Oregon Land Conservation and
Development Act, 10 WILLAMETrE L.J. 414 (1974).
117. Lane County's comprehensive plan has been acknowledged.
118. Telephone interview with Don Oswalt, Plan Review Specialist, LCDC (Oct. 25, 1984).
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submitted." 9 Deadlines have been set and extended several times.12 In
1983, the Oregon legislature required that all comprehensive plans be
acknowledged in their entirety no later than July 1, 1984."l This date
has now passed. LCDC officials are now projecting substantial completion
by January 1985, although they recognize that several smaller jurisdictions
will still not have approved plans.' 22
Neither the great expense of plan development nor the vigorousness
of coastal planning debate was fully anticipated. Both local officials and
local private interests were active in their opposition to the development
and adoption of the coastal goals. Of all the coastal states using the statelocal collaborative planning process, Oregon is reputed to host the most
persistent opposition.'2 3 Proponents of home-rule relented only in the face
of widespread public sentiment in favor of protecting the coast through
planning and the promise of the legislature to turn coastal management
back over to the local jurisdictions once local plans were securely in
place. Even then, some local governments indulged in flagrant footdragging which prompted LCDC, though often reluctant to exercise the full
extent of its authority, to impose an "enforcement order" on one coastal
county. The order included a moratorium on all development outside of
city limits until the county "brings its comprehensive plan and implementing ordinances into compliance with statewide Planning Goals." 124
Conclusion
Two of the three states which delegated substantial coastal planning
responsibilities to local governments experienced significant delays in
119. Id.
120. These delays prompted harsh criticism and threats of funding reductions in OCANM's 1980
Oregon evaluation. OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, EVALUATION OF THE OREGON COASTAL
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR THE PERIOD FROM MARCH THROUGH MARCH 1980 (June 24, 1980).
Other commentators view the delays as reasonable and predictable, given the exacting and detailed
requirements of the coastal goals together with the requirement that they be tied to more general
land use planning in an integrated comprehensive plan. See, e.g., Berg, Comparative Costal Zone
Management-Oregon and Washington, 4 OR. COAST 5 (1981).
121. 1983 Or. Laws ch. 827, 12.
122. Interview with Don Oswlt, supra note 118.
123. Land use planning in Oregon has survived two attempted repeals by initiative petition. In
1976 Oregon voters affirmed their support by a margin of 57 to 43 percent, and in 1978 by 61 to
39 percent. Yet another challenge appeared on the November 1982 ballot, and was defeated 53 to
47 percent.
124. See Living Under an Enforcement Order: An Interview with Kelly Ross, Curry County
Commissioner, 4 Oregon Coast No. 3 at 3 (1981); Fitzpatrick, LCDC: What the Future Holds, 3
Oregon Coast No. 1 at 1, 1-2 (1980). See also Mayea v. Land Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 54
Or. App. 510, 635 P.2d 400 (1981), petitionfor reh'g dismissed as moot, 293 Or. 372, 647 P.2d
920 (1982). In May, 1982 this enforcement order against Curry County was lifted, but Coos and
Columbia counties both were facing possible enforcement orders in August 1982. See Columbia
County v. Land Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 44 Or. App. 749, 606 P.2d 1184 (1980). See also
Oregon Business Planning Council v. Department of Land Conservation and Dev., 290 Or. 741,
626 P.2d 350 (1981).
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completing the process. Only in Washington, where the upland subject
to local planning was very narrow (200 feet), have local governments
completed the process. In contrast, the comprehensive and detailed 1975
California Coastal Plan was completed on schedule under the direction
of California state coastal commission staff. Similarly, the San Francisco
Bay Plan covering only 100 feet of upland was completed on time by
BCDC staff without delegation of significant planning responsibilities to
Bay Area local governments. The experience suggests that many coastal
local governments cannot or will not meet the technical requirements of
comprehensive coastal planning, even with significant federal and state
financial support. With respect to major facilities and regional issues,
planning apparently should be carried out by state rather than local staff.
As the program enforcement discussion in the next section suggests, a
significant state role in implementation of the coastal plan is also necessary.
ENFORCEMENT OF PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
Introduction
The 1972 Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) and related regulations repeatedly refer to the need for effective enforcement. The Act
mandates that where local governments take the leading role in implementing federally-supported coastal programs, the state must reserve
oversight power in order to enforce compliance.'2 States must demonstrate "sufficient authority to assure compliance with the management
program's enforceable policies" during "the period while local programs
are being developed.' 6 State agencies which administer Section 306
funds" 7 must have the administrative capability to monitor and evaluate
the management of the 2state's coastal resources by the various agencies
and local governments.
Jurisdiction
The jurisdictional reach of the four West Coast programs varies widely.
It can be divided roughly into two classes based on the zoning and permit
authority of the coastal management agencies:
Narrow-shorelinecontrol
The BCDC has zoning and permit jurisdiction over the bed of San
Francisco Bay and 100 feet inland. Washington exercises zoning and
125.
126.
127.
§ 1455
128.

16 U.S.C. § 1455(e)(1)(A) (1982).
15 C.F.R. §923.42(b)(2) (1984).
Section 306 grants are administrative grants to the coastal states under the CZMA. 16 U.S.C.
(1982).
15 C.F.R. § 923.47(b)(3) (1984).
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permit control over the seabed and 200 feet inland, and also makes an
attempt to influence development beyond 200 feet by "persuasion" and
by "networking" other planning and environmental laws.
Broad coastal zone control
California exercises zoning and permit authority over beds and shoreline.129 Its jurisdiction extends 1,000 yards inland in most areas, and as
much as five miles or as little as 200 feet in others. Oregon's coastal
program covers the entire watershed of the west side of the Coast Range,
averaging 30 to 50 miles inland."13 These differences in jurisdiction are
significant because of their impact on the monitoring and enforcement
capabilities of the various coastal zone authorities.
BCDC, the first developed coastal zone management program, has the
most limited goals and jurisdiction. BCDC has permit jurisdiction over
San Francisco Bay, the associated tidelands and wetlands, and 100 feet
inland.' The restricted reach is consistent with the limited aspirations
of the agency: i.e., to stop filling of the Bay and to provide more public
access to the beaches and water areas. The legislature did not intend, and
supporters of the Save-the-Bay movement did not advocate giving the
BCDC zoning and permit jurisdiction over the broad upland areas which
might also affect the use of San Francisco Bay. 132 Hence, BCDC has no
jurisdiction over water pollution, air pollution, or solid waste disposal,
unless these activities collaterally produce filling, dredging, or loss of
access to the Bay.
The limited scope of BCDC's zoning and permit jurisdiction renders
it impossible for the agency to control activities beyond 100 feet inland.
This constraint might in the long-run prove detrimental to the control of
filling and dredging in the Bay because activities beyond the 100 foot
strip could conceivably overwhelm the management program for the Bay
itself.
In Washington, Initiative 43, the alternative Shoreline Protection Actrejected in favor of the Shorelines Management Act-proposed zoning
and permit jurisdiction 500 feet inland from ordinary high water. As finally
enacted, however, the SMA provided only for 200 feet of upland jurisdiction. l'
The influence of the BCDC program is clearly visible in the Washington
approach. Although Washington opted for 200 feet of upland, it none129. CAL. PuB. RIs. CODE § 30103(a) (West 1983).
130. Levinson & Hess, supra note 32, at 97.
131. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 66610(b) (West 1983).
132. SAN FRANcIsco BAY CONSERVATION AND DEV. COMM'N. SAN FRANCISCO BAY PLAN 37

(1969).
133. WASH. REv. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(d),(f) (1983).

January 1985]

CZM IN CALIFORNIA

theless followed BCDC in adopting an arbitrary, near shoreline zone
without considering the particular terrain or relationship of adjacent upland and water areas.' 34 The restrictive nature of Washington's jurisdictional limits poses obvious problems for management of the coastal zone.
As noted above regarding BCDC, activities occurring on adjacent uplands
can become so important that they overwhelm the management regime
for the narrow 200 foot strip next to the water.'35
In the past few years, Washington has attempted to implement its coastal
136
zone policies in the uplands adjacent to the 200 foot shoreline strip,
but only after pressure from the federal OCZM. These adjacent lands are
called the "second tier"'137 and are classed as a "planning and administrative" area. This second tier includes the 15 counties adjoining marine
waters.' 38 In 1976, the Washington CZM program document submitted
to OCZM for federal approval provided that the state would control
activities in the second tier that "have a direct and significant impact on
coastal waters or directly affect the coastal zone." The state would exercise
such power through enforcement of its "planning and administrative"
controls under the State Environmental Policy Act, 139 the Environmental
134. Id. § 90.58.030(2)(f). In Washington, "shorelines" are all of the waters and beds of the
state, including reservoirs, and their associated wetlands except for shorelines of statewide significance, and except for streams with a mean annual flow of less than 20 cfs and lakes under 20 acres.
"Shorelines of statewide significance" were thought to be of sufficient importance to the state as a
whole to give the Department of Ecology greater authority over them. Those shorelines include all
the bed of Puget Sound and the Straits of Juan de Fuca below extreme low tide, all the ocean
coastline below ordinary high water mark, certain specific named bays and the larger lakes and
streams of the state, plus associated wetlands. As mentioned in the text, a strip of land 200 feet
inland from ordinary high water mark is included as well.
135. Shorelines Management '77: Performanceand Prospects, Proceedings, Sept. 22-23 (1977)
University of Washington, Seattle, 1-2 (chapter by Jens Sorensen). According to Sorensen, "If the
SMA has an achilles heel, it is the 200 foot inland limit." Id. at 5. This limits the state's ability to
persuade local governments to manage beyond-the-boundary land use activities that have a direct
and significant effect on coastal resources (or access to coastal resources).
136. See generally, OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, EVALUATION FINDINGS FOR THE
WASHINGTON COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR THE PERIOD FROM JANUARY THROUGH
JANUARY 1981 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 EVALUATION FINDINGS].

137. The first comprising the bed of the water and the 200 foot upland strip.
138. WASHINGTON COASTAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 21, at 119.

139. Environmental impact statements prepared under Washington's State Environmental Policy
Act (SEPA) often have played an important role in decisionmaking under the SMA. See, e.g., State
v. Lake Lawrence Pub. Lands Protection Ass'n, 92 Wash. 2d 656, 601 P.2d 494 (1979); Merkel v.
Port of Brownsville, 8 Wash. App. 844, 509 P.2d 390 (1973).
On the other hand, environmental impact reports prepared under the California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA) generally have not been used as effectively by BCDC, the California Coastal
commissions, and the California coastal local governments. See, e.g., City of Coronado v. California
Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 69 Cal. 3d 570, 138 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1977). But cf. Coastal
Southwest Dev. Corp. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 55 Cal. App. 3d 525, 127
Cal. Rptr. 775 (1976). See also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE. § 21080.5 (West 1983); 1978 Cal. Stat. ch.
1075.
Both CEQA and SEPA are patterned after the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Unfortunately, Oregon does not have a "little" NEPA, like SEPA or CEQA.
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Coordination Procedures Act, water and air pollution control laws and
other "networked" controls.
OCZM has been consistently critical of Washington's sluggish implementation of coastal management policies in the second tier. In 1978,
the federal agency reported:
A major basis of the approval of Washington's program [in 1976]
was the extension of the state's control and CZM activities beyond
the limited 200 feet of the SMA. In negotiations with environmental
groups and federal agencies, the network of control beyond 200 feet
was a major response to their concerns. 4
The review further noted that the Washington program had failed to
live up to the hopes and expectations in this second tier area, observing
that the DOE's "principal focus is on the first tier." Also, "inadequate
attention" was being given to management of uses throughout the coastal
counties which were intended, under the network concept, to be subject
to CZM policies.' 4
Continuing questions were asked by OCZM about the state's intentions
in implementing its coastal zone policies in second tier lands.142 In June
1981, a meeting was held in which further questions were directed by
OCZM personnel to state officials.' 43 On July 14, 1981, a Washington
state assistant attorney general responded by pointing out the limited
nature of the powers of the state Department of Ecology to enforce
policies in the adjacent land areas under existing laws. " OCZM expressed
dissatisfaction with this response in its 1981 evaluation of the Washington
program:
[I]n order for the WCZMP to be sufficiently pervasive in managing
the coastal resources of the state, the adjacent lands must be managed
in a manner consistent with the SMA. [OCZM assumed] as a condition of approving the SCZMP that such management would take
place. The DOE has not provided the OCZM with adequate information concerning DOE's management activities of adjacent lands
as related to CZMP...
Also, State [sic] agencies and local governments are uncertain of
the relationship of the various authorities (SMA, SEPA, Forest Practices Act) to the WCZP along with selected activities and responsibilities of other state agencies, notably the DNR .... Over the past
140. Office of Coastsal Zone Management, 1978 Annual Review and Action Memo at 14.
141. Id.
142. 1981 EVALUATION FINDINGS, supra note 135, at 6.
143. Interview with Charles Roe, Assistant Attorney General, Washington State Department of
Ecology, in Olympia, Washington (July 8, 1981).
144. Washington State Dep't of Ecology, Adjacent Lands Guidance (Apr. 1982) [hereinafter cited
as Adjacent Lands Guidance].
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and state agencies to
five years, the relationship of these authorities
45
the WCZMP has become muddled.'
a document setting out its
OCZM recommended that DOE "produce
146
management scheme for adjacent lands.
In 1982, DOE attempted to meet this criticism by publishing Adjacent
Lands Guidance.47 This document confirms DOE's lack of authority to
regulate individuals in the adjacent lands area through zoning or permit
procedures. DOE has the authority only over governmental entities, and
then only in certain aspects of planning. The SMA requires that state
agencies and local governments make their plans, policies, and regulations
48
consistent with the SMA, the guidelines, and relevant master programs. '
local
DOE speculated that it might have to seek a mandamus against
49
governments if they failed to comply with this requirement. 1
Adjacent Lands Guidance also noted that other remedies were available
to DOE, such as promulgation of regulations, requiring adoption of adjacent land policy in local master programs, persuasion, and use of Section
306 grants.' 50 In effect, however, this document does not provide any
effective means of enforcing the state's coastal policies in the second tier
area. The first, second, and last of the implementation suggestions above
are, at most, mere possibilities, with little likelihood of implementation,
and the third seems more an idle hope than an implementation strategy.
As might be expected, the 1982 OCZM evaluation noted little progress
on implementation of Adjacent Lands Guidance."'
The Washington legislature is unlikely to expand DOE's zoning and
permit jurisdiction into the adjacent lands or otherwise provide a sound
legal basis for adjacent lands management. No serious proposals for such
expansion have been considered. DOE's past lack of assertiveness in
implementing coastal management policies in the second tier does not
bode well for effective implementation. Without sharp prodding and grantwithholding threats from OCZM, it seems unlikely that DOE would have
produced AdjacentLands Guidance. A concerted effort by the Department
of Ecology to obtain greater coordination with local governments with
regard to the adjacent lands has reduced OCZM criticism. In the 1983
and 1984 evaluations this aspect of the state program was no longer
raised.
EVALUATION FINDINGS, supra note 135, at 8.
146. Id. at 9.
147. Adjacent Lands Guidance, supra note 144.
148. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.340 (1983).
149. Adjacent Lands GuidanceAvailable, 6 Washington Coastal Currents No. 9, 1 (June 1982);
Adjacent Lands Guidance, supra note 144, at 27.
150. Adjacent Lands Guidance, supra note 144, at 27.
151. OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEME:Tr, EVALUATION FINDINGS FOR THE WASHINGTON COASTAL
ZONE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR THE PERIOD FROM JANUARY THROUGH JANUARY 11 (1982).

145. 1981
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In contrast to Washington and BCDC, the California and Oregon programs cover broad upland areas along the coast. In California, the planning, zoning, and permit jurisdiction extends 1,000 yards inland from
mean high tide. In 18 locations the boundary extends inland up to five
miles where necessary to encompass significant coastal estuaries, habitats,
and recreation areas. The boundary shrinks to a minimum of about 200
feet inland to exclude certain urban areas. California has approximately
1,100 miles of coastline. The coastal zone jurisdiction area covers approximately 5,813 square miles or four percent of the state's total area.
This includes 4,263 square miles of ocean and 2,550 square miles of
shorelands.' 5 2
Consistent with the broad extent of California's and Oregon's coastal
zones is the breadth of their planning goals. Both California and Oregon
maintain control of the principal uses of the upland that will impact the
coastal zone.153 Illustrative of this breadth of scope are the attempts by
the California Coastal Commission and the Oregon LCDC to preserve
open space, scenic beauty, and agricultural productivity by requiring
agricultural lands to be retained for that use, and to control other elements
normally included in comprehensive land-use planning. 154
BCDC, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with prohibiting
further filling of San Francisco Bay and enhancing public access to the
Bay.'55 Washington is similarly concerned with stopping filling, providing
public access, and some additional matters such as view preservation. 156
BCDC and Washington are not and, because of limited geographical
jurisdiction, cannot be concerned, as in California and Oregon, with
comprehensive land-use planning for the coastal region.
BCDC
BCDC has a small (three person) enforcement staff charged with ensuring that both construction and operating conditions imposed in BCDC
permits are met. For violations, BCDC has the authority to order that
construction or operations cease. The enforcement section also watches
for unpermitted activity and, if such activity is discovered, the staff may
convince those pursuing this activity to seek a BCDC permit.'5 7
152. 1 SORENSEN &

(1976).
153. See

DICKERT, COLLABORATIVE LAND USE PLANNING IN THE COASTAL ZONE

7-9

STATE-WIDE PLANNING GOALS, supra note 42; CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30103 (West
1983).
154. See STATE-WIDE PLANNING GOALS, supra note 42; CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §30103 (West
1983).
155. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 66601, 66602, 66605, 66605.1 (West 1983).
156. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020 (1983).
157. Interview with Michael B. Wilmar, Executive Director, San Francisco Bay Conservation
and Development Commission, and Russell A. Abramson, Associate Executive Director, San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (May 31, 1982).
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Citizen participation is an effective supplement to the staff's monitoring
and enforcement efforts. Recently the "Save San Francisco Bay" group
established an "Adopt a Shoreline" program to monitor and report suspect
activities around the Bay. In addition to "Save the Bay" a number of
groups and individuals have made significant contributions to BCDC's
monitoring and enforcement program. It is unlikely that the staff could
monitor activities within BCDC's jurisdiction effectively without such
grassroots support."'
The CaliforniaProgram
The California State Coastal Commission is required, 59 at five-year
intervals, to review certified local programs for conformity with the Act's
policies and to suggest corrective actions to local government. If local
government should be unresponsive, however, the commission has no
ability to decertify or apply sanctions. The statute provides only that the
commission can report inaction to the legislature." 6
The Coastal Act also provides a permit appeals procedure and an LCP
amendment process which maintain the involvement of the State Coastal
Commission. 6 ' In addition, the 1976 Coastal Act specified that permit
authority for any development "proposed or undertaken on any tidelands,
submerged lands or on public trust lands. . ., within ports ... or within
any state university or college within the coastal zone" shall not be
delegated to local government even after LCP certification.' 62 For any
development between the nearest public road and the sea, the issuing
agency must find the development in conformity with the Act's public
access and public recreation policies. 63 Any aggrieved person has the
right to seek judicial review of commission decisions" and of local
government actions made after certification of the LCP 65
The commission also has appellate jurisdiction over a limited number
of situations. Appeal from local decisions can be made to the commission
only for approvals granted to developments which lie: 1) between the sea
and the first public road paralleling the sea; 2) on tidelands, submerged
lands, or public trust lands; 3) within 100 feet of any wetland or stream,
or within 30 feet of the top of the seaward face of any coastal bluff; 4)
within a sensitive coastal resource area; 5) on land not designated as the
158. Telephone interview with Russell A. Abramson, Associate Executive Director, San Francisco
Bay Conservation and Development Commission (Sept. 10, 1982).
159. See CAL. Pun. REs. CODE § 30519(a) (West 1983).
160. Id. § 30517.5(3).
161. Id.§§30514, 10602.
162. Id.§ 30519(b).
163. Id.§ 30604(c).
164. Id.§ 30801.
165. Id. § 30802.
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principal permitted use; or 6) on land to be used for major public works
projects or energy facilities.' 6 6 Furthermore, the grounds for appealing
such developments are limited to the following: 1) failure to provide for
or interference with access; 2) failure to protect public view; 3) incompatibility with established physical scale; 4) significant alteration of natural landforms; 5) failure to comply with shoreline erosion or geological
setback requirements; 6 7 or 6) lack of conformity with the certified LCP.R68
The LCP amendment process provides still another means for commission control after LCP certification. The local government may amend
its program, but such an amendment does not become effective until
certified by the commission.'69 No more than three amendments can be
proposed in any one year. 70
The Washington Program
The state Department of Ecology (DOE), which originally reviewed
and approved local governments' shoreline master programs, maintains
supervisory authority and monitors permits issued by local governments.
As an agency for implementing and enforcing state CZM policies, DOE
seems to have an organizational advantage over California's Coastal Commission. In addition to its coastal management responsibilities, the DOE
is charged with water and air pollution control, supervision of toxic waste
disposal, and implementation of the state's Environmental Policy Act.' 7
The existence of all these interrelated enforcement powers in the same
agency would appear to facilitate coordinated implementation. Other factors, however, have hindered effective implementation. The fact that
coastal management responsibilities are reposed in a "line agency" rather
than in an independent or semi-independent commission means that the
agency is more vulnerable to the winds of political change. The director
of the DOE is appointed by the governor, serves at the governor's pleasure, 72 and, thus, must reflect the governor's priorities.
In 1976, Washington elected Dixie Lee Ray as governor. She gave
lower priority to environmental and coastal zone matters than did her
three-term predecessor, Daniel Evans. In 1980, Governor Ray lost to
John Spellman, who maintained a low profile on environmental and coastal
zone matters, albeit not to the degree exhibited by Governor Ray. Di166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 30603(a).
§30603(b).
§30603(c).
§30514(a).
§30514(b).

WASH REV. CODE §§43.21A.020, 43.21A.060 (1983); WASHINGTON COASTAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 21, at 51.
172. WASH. REV. CODE §43.21A.050 (1983); WASHINGTON COASTAL MANAGEMENT, supra note

21, at 51.
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minished gubernatorial enthusiasm for coastal zone management helps to
explain DOE's recent lack of assertiveness in implementing and enforcing
Washington's coastal management plan. Lessened gubernatorial priority
also may help to explain why the DOE has failed to enforce its "networked" management plan for the second tier lands described earlier.
In its 1980 annual review of the Washington plan, the OCZM urged
more leadership by DOE in key program management areas, including
the need to investigate reports of local program violations, to enforce
SMA policies for adjacent or second tier lands, and to identify important
issues raised by major development proposals. Also needed is protection
of coastal dunes in excess of 200 feet from the shoreline, development
of coastal management plans for Indian tribes, updating and expanding
the coastal Atlas, and providing technical assistance to local governments.
Similar criticism was voiced in 1981 when OCZM urged that "[Tlhe
DOE should be a source of leadership and direction for resolving ...
coastal management."' 7 3 The OCZM especially called attention to the
adjacent lands question and the need for providing more effective enforcement of the state and local programs. Prodded by this and other
criticism of its lack of aggressiveness, the DOE took a strong and, as it
turned out,
effective stand on the large Chicago Bridge and Iron Company
74
project.
In 1983 and 1984, the DOE endeavored to assert greater leadership.
In 1983, DOE contracted for two independent studies, one concerning
the effectiveness of local shoreline management programs,' 75 and another
concerning public perception of the Shoreline Management Act and its
implementation. 176 In addition, the Department conducted an in-house
evaluation of public access to Washington's shorelines. 77 These studies
provide the foundation for administrative changes designed to enhance
the effectiveness of the state's coastal zone management program.
Another active agency in enforcement of the Washington coastal management plan is the Shorelines Hearing Board (SHB). This quasi-judicial
board serves an important role in providing a sense of fairness, credibility,
and legality to the program. During the period prior to the approval of
local master programs, development permits issued by local governments
have been measured directly against the policies of the SMA and the
DOE's guidelines and regulations. The DOE has monitored local permit
173. See generally 1981 EVALUATION FNDINGS, supra note 135.
174. See discussion supra at notes 27-28.
175. Nancy Fox & Susan Heikkala, Shoreline Master Program Study: Analysis Report (Sept.
1983) (prepared for the Washington State Department of Ecology).
176. League of Women Voters of Washington, Public Perception of the Washington Shoreline
Management Act (July 1983) (prepared for the Washington State Department of Ecology).
177. James W. Scott, An Evaluation of Public Access to Washington's Shorelines (Sept. 1983)
(available from the Shorelands Division, Washington State Department of Ecology).
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issuance, and either the DOE or the attorney general may seek review
by the SHB. After approval, appeals may be taken to the SHB as a quasijudicial body,'78 by DOE, the state attorney general, or "any person
aggrieved" by the granting or denying of a permit on shorelines of the
state.' 79 The party seeking review has the burden of proof. SHB decisions
can be appealed to superior court and from there to the Washington
Supreme Court.
In Departmentof Ecology v. BallardElks Club, o a 1974 case decided
by the Washington Supreme Court, DOE argued that appeals to the courts
from permit decisions should be taken from the local government decision
rather than from the decision of the SHB, especially when the reviewed
local action has the concurrence of the DOE.' 8 ' The court rejected this
argument, firmly establishing that the SHB was the administrative agency
from which appeals to the courts were to be taken.' 82 The supreme court
decision also established that the Board is to play a "quasi-judicial" rather
than a "policy-making" role. Under Washington administrative law, decisions of the SHB are not to be overturned unless they are "clearly
erroneous."' 8 3 The Board's stature has been enhanced by its membership,
three of whom are members of the State Pollution Control Board: one
appointed by the Association of Washington Cities; one appointed by the
Association of County Commissioners; and the last by the state land
commissioner or his designee.' 84 The Board has rendered decisions contrary to those of local governments and the DOE.'85 Both its ready availability and its independence have helped to create an atmosphere of
objectivity in the implementation of the SMA.
The Oregon Program
Given the past antipathy of many coastal local governments to the
planning process, a reasonable prediction is that many will be less than
enthusiastic about enforcing the provisions of their own approved comprehensive plans. No coastal management program may be counted an
unqualified success without provisions for close monitoring of local government land and water use action. Many will agree that monitoring in
some form is necesssary to protect both the resources of the coastal zone
178. WASH. REv. CODE § 90.58.170 (1981).
179. Id. § 90.58.180.
180. 84 Wash. 2d 551, 527 P.2d 1121 (1974). 181. Id. at 553-54, 527 P.2d 1123.
181. Id. at 553-54, 527 P.2d 1123.
182. Id. at 559, 527 P.2d at 1126.
183. See Comment, Judicial Review of Shorelines Hearings Board Decisions: Department of
Ecology v. BallardElks Lodge No. 827, 51 WASH. L. REv. 405, 415-21 (1976).
184. WASH. Rv. CODE § 90.58.170 (1981).
185. STATE OF WASHINGTON SHORELINES HEARING BOARD, DIGEST OF DECISIONS (2d ed. 1983)
(a compilation of SHB decisions from June 1971 to Sept. 1983).
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and the state's large monetary investment in coastal planning. Indeed,
Oregon's land use legislation provided for state monitoring of local land
use decisions, but the provisions remain largely unimplemented.' 86
Local jurisdictions have violated both the letter and spirit of the Statewide Planning Goals, usually because of the lack of commitment to
standards not of their own making or because of indequate familiarity
with state and federal guidelines. Other violations have occurred as a
result of economic and political pressures from local interests.' 87
A 1981 study, undertaken by an Oregon public interest law firm devoted
to land-use issues, documents widespread goal violations by local juris-

dictions with both approved and unapproved comprehensive plans.' 88
While no similar study has been conducted for those jurisdictions which
lie within Oregon's coastal zone, presumably illegal land and water use
decisions which affect the coastal zone are being made at a comparable
rate.
The OCZM has been highly critical of Oregon's monitoring of its
coastal management program, singling monitoring out as perhaps the

most significant deficiency of the state's program.' 89 Every OCZM eval-

uation issued to date has encouraged the Department of Land Conservation
and Development to take the lead in monitoring local government land
and water use decisions. Such surveillance would include not only interim
monitoring while a comprehensive plan is under development but also
monitoring following approval of the plan. Indeed, the OCZM has made
it clear that it expects the DLCD to be chiefly responsible. "9LCDC and
its administrative staff are thus caught between opposing and insistent
forces: OCZM urging closer day-to-day monitoring of the implementation
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.260, .640 (1983).
187. Comment reflects the authors' experience.
188. Benner, EFU Study Exposes County Subversion of Farm Zoning, 1000 FRIENDS OF OREGON
NEWSLErER 2-3 (1981). "Of the 1,064 decisions reviewed, counties approve the overwhelming
majority of applications for residences in farm zones (90 percent). Of these, the overwhelming
majority are improper (81 percent). County officials are either disregarding or misapplying the farm
and nonfarm standards developed by the Legislature and LCDC." Comments of the Natural Resource
Defense Council, Inc. on the Office of Coastal Zone Management's 1980 Section 312 Evaluation
of the Oregon Coastal Management Program 5 (Mar. 31, 1980). Regarding coastal jurisdictions'
misapplication of the coastal goals, informal interviews with local officials of Oregon's coastside
counties conducted by representatives of the Natural Resources Defense Council reveal "a wide
range in the extent to which permits and land use changes subject to local control are handled with
an eye to compliance with the Goals." Id. Where permits are granted, follow-up inspections to
insure compliance are rarely conducted, and where they are it is usually in response to a citizen
complaint. Where violations are turned up and reported to a state agency, that agency sometimes
merely ignores the violation. The report cites many incidents which "dramatize the necessity of
periodic inspections and cast in question the purported readiness of state and local authorities to
respond vigorously to violations unearthed by private citizens." Id. at 9.
189. 1982 EVALUATION FINDINGS, supra note 43, at 12.
190. See, e.g., OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, PERFORMANCE REvIEw OF THE OREGON
COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR THE PERIOD FROM APRIL THROUGH FEBRUARY 10 (1981).

186.
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of local comprehensive plans, and local governments insisting on greater
freedom to make and carry out their own decisions.
Except for those activities which specifically require a permit from a
state or federal agency, nearly all routine land or water use decisions
made by a local government are unmonitored by any agency of the State
of Oregon. By default, the burden has fallen on private citizens and public
interest groups. This, of course, was not the intention of the drafters of
the CZMA. Yet, contrary to the expectations of the OCZM, the political
climate makes it presently unrealistic to hope otherwise. The diminishing
financial resources and increasing demands on the staff at most state
agencies, and on the DLCD in particular, preclude agency response to
all but the most flagrant violations. The situation is not likely to improve
with depressed economy and dwindling federal support.
The Oregon legislature's response to these problems was mixed. When
statewide land-use planning was first enacted in 1973, the legislature did
not intend that the DLCD should watch over the routine implementation
of comprehensive plans.19' The Department's review power was intended
to be broader and more general.' 92 The federal CZMA requirements for
monitoring and enforcement were either ignored or dismissed because,
at the time, development of Oregon's coastal program still lay in the
future. The 1981 legislature clarified DLCD's powers somewhat. Under
the 1981 amendments to the state land use law, DLCD may review
amendments to approved comprehensive plans and land use regulations
as they arise. DLCD must conduct general reviews for continued compliance not less than once every five years. 93
' Periodic review is made to
determine:
1) Whether the circumstances or assumptions on which the plan and
regulations were based have changed to such a degree that the
latter no longer comply with the Statewide Planning Goals;
2) Whether subsequently adopted goals or administrative rules render the plan obsolete; or
3) Whether the plan or regulations are inconsistent with subsequently
adopted state or federal law, where compliance can not be achieved
through the existing plan or regulations."9
Enforcement powers also are assigned to the Department. Upon finding
that an approved local plan is deficient or that a local government has
191. See generally OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005-.795 (1983).
192. See id. §§ 197.090, 197.285, 197.300 (1983).
193. Id. § 197.640 (1983). OCZM considered these changes significant enough to constitute
amendments to the Oregon coastal management program requiring federal approval. 1982 EVALUATION FINDINGS, supra note 43, at 9. See generally Schell, 1981 Legislative Changes in Oregon's
Land Use System-the Sound and the Fury of a Small Tragedy, 18 WILLAME-r L.J. 49 (1982).
194. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.640(3)(a),(b),(c) (1983).
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engaged in a "pattern or practice of decisionmaking" which violated
either an approved plan or land use regulation, LCDC may impose an
"enforcement order" upon the local government, prohibiting further development. Grant funds also may be withheld. 95 Standing to appeal land
96
use decisions has long been a subject of uncertainty in Oregon.' The
1981 legislature decided to clarify the issue. The result was to erect a
new barrier against citizen lawsuits and appeals: no party (including
DLCD) has standing to appeal, either to LCDC or to the court of appeals,
unless he or she first participated in the local proceedings. 9 7 Unless a
land use decision is first protested on the local level, an individual or
organization effectively waives its right to appeal. 98 The new law contains
a provision whereby an interested party may request notification of impending land-use decisions at the local level by paying the appropriate
fee to the director of DLCD. The law evidently now places a heavy
burden on "watchdog" organizations. Such organizations lack the resources to place a representative at every public meeting where a land
use decision is likely to be made or to comment by mail.
The 1981 legislature's restriction on standing took effect about the
same time the Oregon Court of Appeals stripped the DLCD of its presumed
power to appeal land use decisions of local governments.'99 As a result
of these independent events, the process for monitoring local land use
decisions was weakened.
195. OR. REv. STAT. § 197.320 (1983). The 1981 legislature also complicated the program
enforcement process by enacting the "Lots of Record" legislation, 1981 Or. Laws., ch. 884, 9-12,
which for lots of records in unincorporated areas prohibits counties from denying building permits
based on changes in zoning or plans subsequent to the lots' creation.
196. See Brown, A FurtherAnalysis of Judicial Review of Land Use Controls in Oregon, 12
WILLAMETrE L.J. 45 (1975); Sullivan, From Kronerto Fasano-An Analysis of JudicialReview of
Land Use Regulation in Oregon, 10 WILLAMETrE L.J. 358 (1974). See generallyOREGON CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION, LAND USE (1982).
197. OR. REv. STAT. § 197.830 (1983).
198. Since codified as OR. REv. STAT. § 197.620(l)(a) (1983) which provides:
Persons who participated either orally or in writing in the local government proceedings leading to the adoption of an amendment to an acknowledged comprehensive plan or a new land use regulation may mail or otherwise submit written
objections to the director and the local government not later than 30 days after the
date of the final decision by the local government.
199. Ochoco Constr., Inc., v. Land Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 56 Or. App. 32, 43, 641
P.2d 49, 55 (1982), petition for review granted, 293 Or. 103, 648 P.2d 850 (1982).
The roles to be played by the Department, its Director, and LCDC are clearly
and concisely stated in the statutes. Those statutes do not expressly authorize the
Department to contest land use decisions made by local governments after LCDC
has acknowledged those governments' comprehensive plans. Neither do we think
the authority may be implied. In light of the legislature's expressed preference for
local management of land use planning and its circumscribed grants of authority to
the Department and LCDC, we think that if the legislature had intended to convey
such a significant power to the Department, it would have specifically expressed its
intent to do so.
Id. at 42, 641 P.2d at 54-55.
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The OCZM, in its February 1982 evaluation of the Oregon program,2
observed the above developments with concern. 20 ' In addition, OCZM
noted potential enforcement problems created by the expiration of the
statute providing for the state Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) in
July, 1983, and the fact that no limit is placed on local government
amendments to their comprehensive plans.20 2 Unless either LCDC or third
parties comment on a proposed amendment, the amendment becomes
effective automatically. Thus LCDC could easily be overwhelmed by the
plan amendment process. Other state agencies, moreover, have expressed
concern about their abilities to participate meaningfully in the local plan
amendment process. 0 3 In addition to widespread local government goal
violations, OCZM noted problems of state agency compliance with the
goals in their permitting decisions as required by the state land use planning law, 2' and urged greater LCDC enforcement of that mandate. Similar
problems may be expected as more local plans are acknowledged.2 5
Conclusion
Inadequate enforcement of program requirements has been the most
common criticism of coastal zone management in all three states. Enforcement often has been initiated by citizen groups rather than by the
agencies assigned with enforcement responsibilities. While some past
enforcement problems may have been typical of most resource management and pollution control programs, several reductions in coastal management funding, recent amendments to key coastal regulatory laws, and
changing political priorities generally suggest that these enforcement difficulties have the potential for undoing a decade of effort in all three
states.
One possible solution to enforcement difficulties in California and Oregon would be to reduce the programs' comprehensiveness. Both the
issues addressed and the geographic coverage may need to be narrowed,
so that they are similar to the more restricted BCDC and Washington
programs. Unfortunately, to sacrifice comprehensiveness for enforceability may be the most realistic way to ensure meaningful program survival
and continued federal support. If federal approval were withdrawn owing
to lack of enforcement, as OCZM on occasion has threatened, then, along
with any remaining federal funds, the West Coast States would lose the
benefits of the CZMA's consistency provision discussed below.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

1982 EVALUATION FINDINGS, supra note 43.
Id.
Id.
Id.
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.180(l)(a) (1983).
1982 EVALUATION FINDINGS, supra note 43, at 12.
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FEDERAL CONSISTENCY WITH APPROVED STATE PROGRAMS
Introduction
When Congress enacted the CZMA in 1972, the Act was widely praised
as an important step toward realigning regulatory power from federal to
state and local levels. Under the "federal consistency" provisions of the
CZMA, private activities permitted by a federal agency and activities
undertaken or funded by that agency must conform to a state's federally
approved coastal management program wherever those activities directly
affect that state's coastal zone.2" 6

Section 307 of the CZMA contains the federal consistency provisions.
Activities, including development projects, directly affecting the coastal
zone and which are conducted or supported by federal agencies shall be
consistent with approved state programs to the "maximum extent practicable."'2 07 Perhaps the most important federal consistency provision 2 8
provides that federal licenses and permits for activities directly affecting
land and water uses in the coastal zone may be granted only when the
state certifies that the activity complies with and will be conducted in a
manner consistent with its coastal management program. Any activity for
which a federal license, permit, or grant is required is thus subject to the
consistency provision--even though it may be located outside a state's
coastal zone-provided that the activity significantly affects the coastal
zone. 209
Citizen enforcement of the federal consistency requirements received
a significant boost in the August 1982 decision of the Ninth Circuit Court
of appeals in Californiav. Watt.2 0 The court held that groups, such as
the Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth,
Friends of the Sea Otter, and the Environmental Coalition on Lease Sale
53 had standing to enforce compliance by the Department of the Interior
with the federal consistency requirements in connection with Interior's
outer continental shelf lease sale 53 off California.2 ' Although the Supreme Court reversed on the merits as discussed below, it left intact the
Ninth Circuit's standing ruling.
States must include in their coastal management plans the procedures
to implement the federal consistency requirements. The following items
206. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1982).
207. Id. § 1456(c)(1).
208. Id.§ 1456(c)(3)(A).
209. Contrary to the misunderstanding of many, the Act does not compel a federal agency to
issue a permit for any activity which does not violate the provisions of an approved coastal management plan. Where federal criteria are more exacting than local, they will take precedence.
210. 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), aff'g. in part and rev'g in part, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D.
Cal. 1981), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Secretary of Interior v. California, - U.S. -, 104
S. Ct. 656 (1984).
211. 683 F.2d at 1258, 1269-70.
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at a minimum must be included: which state agency will handle consistency review,212 a listing of federal activities subject to review, 213 outer
continental shelf plans which detail federal license and permit activities,
and public notice procedures. 14 Federal regulations also provide for a
mediation process in cases of serious disagreement between any federal
agency and a coastal state. 215 This mediation process may be unilaterally
terminated." 6 Judicial review may be sought by either of the disagreeing
parties after exhaustion of the mediation process.21 7 Neither the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) nor the states are authorized to enforce compliance with consistency determinations.2"'
Even with these qualifications, the operation of the consistency provisions, combined with the financial support which the Act provides for
developing and administering coastal management programs, offers powerful incentives for coastal states to participate in the federal program.
Without the prospect of "federal consistency" virtually all federal projects
and actions affecting a state's coastal zone fall outside the states' regulatory powers.
Amendments to the CZMA in 1976 were intended to clarify the applicability of consistency requirements to federal outer continental shelf
(OCS) oil and gas leasing activities."' The word "lease" was added to
clarify that federal leases as well22 as licenses and permits must be consistent
with approved state programs.
There are, however, important qualifications to the Act's consistency
provisions. The U.S. Secretary of Commerce may override a state's
finding that a federal license, permit, or grant is inconsistent with its
program. The secretary must determine that the project is "necessary in
the interest of national security" or that the activity is otherwise consistent
with the objectives of the Act.22 ' Apparently, the legislative intent was
to confine the commerce secretary's veto power to situations where national interest or security outweighs coastal management objectives. The
language of the Act and its implementing regulations, however, are suf212. 15 C.F.R. §923.53(a)(1) (1984).
213. Id. §923.53(a)(2).
214. Id. §923.53(a)(4).
215. Id. § 923.54.
216. Id. §923.54(j).
217. Id. §923.54(k).
218. Demase, Spradley & Cusano, Legal Issues Involved in Enforcement of Coastal Zone Management Provisions, in 4 COASTAL ZONE '80 2992 (B. Edge ed. 1982).
219. Yudes, Coastal Zone Impacts of Offshore Oil & Gas Development An Accommodation
Through the California CoastalAct of 1976, 8 PAC. L.J. 783, 798 (1977).
220. S. REP. NO. 277, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
1769, 1770.
221. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A)(iii) (1982).
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ficiently ambiguous that uncertainties about the extent of the secretary's
discretion will no doubt persist for years.
BCDC
BCDC's San Francisco Bay Plan has been certified as part of California's federally-approved coastal management program. BCDC also administers the federal consistency process for federal actions affecting its
jurisdiction. For the balance of the California coastal zone, the California
Coastal Commission administers the consistency process.
BCDC has used the consistency process to affect federal decisionmaking on several occasions. In 1980, for example, the federal General
Services Administration began to dispose of portions of Hamilton Air
Force Base in Marin County. The actions by GSA would have effectively
foreclosed future use of Hamilton for aviation purposes. Hamilton is
within BCDC's jurisdiction, and the Bay Plan designated the base for
"airport priority use" pending completion of BCDC's regional airport
system study.222 BCDC informed GSA that a consistency determination
was required for the actions contemplated by GSA.223 When GSA did not
respond, the state's attorney general filed suit on behalf of BCDC. "24 The
suit was not pursued because GSA halted the Hamilton disposal process.
BCDC then completed its system study. 25 In a similar manner, BCDC
influenced the disposition of U.S. Army lands within the Port of Oakland.
The CaliforniaProgram
The California Coastal Act of 1976 includes the declaration that: "All
public agencies and all federal agencies, to the extent possible under
federal law or regulations or the limited State Constitution" must comply
with the Act's provisions.22 6 The State Coastal Commission is authorized
to exercise federal consistency reviews.227 The Commission has promul222. Greenberg, Federal Consistency Under the Coastal Zone Management Act: An Emerging
Focus of Environmental Controversy in the 1980s, 11 ENVTL. L. REp. (ENVTL. L. INsr.) 50001,
50007 (1981).
223. Id.
224. California ex rel San Francisco Bay Conservation and Dev. Comm'n. v. United States, Civil
No. C-80-3132 RPA (N.D. Cal., filed July 30, 1980).
225. See Greenberg, supra note 222, at 50001. City and County of San Francisco v. United
States, 615 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd 443 F. Supp. 1116 (N.D. Cal. 1977), mentioned the
need for BCDC to make a consistency determination relative to a Navy lease of land within BCDC's
jurisdictional area. The court held that the BCDC plan had not been approved by the Secretary of
Commerce at the time of the effective date of the lease and consequently BCDC did not have the
power to make a consistency determination in the matter. But cf. People's Counsel for Baltimore
County v. Alexander, 17 ENvrL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.) 1963 (D. Md. 1980).
226. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §30003 (West 1983).

227. Id. § 30330.
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gated regulations on OCS federal consistency determinations 22 which
specify the federal activities subject to consistency review. 229 The procedural and hearing requirements for the commission's consistency determinations are also covered by the regulations." 0
Although California's coastal management program was approved by
NOAA in November 1977,231 the federal consistency obligation did not
apply until the court upheld federal approval of California's program in
American Petroleum Institute v. Knecht.232 The court found that NOAA's
actions (i.e., approving California's program) had not been arbitrary and
capricious as the plaintiff claimed. 3 The court also rejected plaintiff's
argument that California's program did not adequately consider national
interests as required by the federal CZMA.234
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's California v. Watt decision on the merits and ruled that the consistency provisions do not apply at the lease sale stage of OCS oil and gas development.
The Court stated, however, that the states can veto subsequent steps,
such as exploration and development plans, which they find to be inconsistent with their coastal programs, 5 and nearly all of California's use
of the federal consistency requirement has been in connection with offshore oil and gas operations. Subsequent to the American Petroleum
Institute v. Knecht ruling,236 the process has accelerated substantially; by
October 1984 the commission had processed 55 consistency reviews in
that year alone. 37 Furthermore, the commission has concurred in virtually
all consistency certifications.2 '
The consistency obligation gives California a key role in important
federal agency decisions. Prior to implementation of the consistency obligation, coordination and communication between federal agencies and
the state were often inadequate, sometimes nonexistent.23 9 In its 1980228. CAL. PuB. RSs. CODE § 13660 (West 1983).
229. Id. § 13660.1(a).
230. Id. § 13660.8(a).
231. Karp, Consistency Review of OCS Activities off California, in 3 COASTAL ZONE '80 2103
(B. Edge ed. 1982).
232. 456 F. Supp. 889 (C.D. Cal. 1978), aft'd, 609 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1979).
233. 456 F. Supp. at 921.
234. Id. at 925-26.
235. Secretary of the Interior v. California,_
U.S. -,
104 S. Ct. 656 (1984), rev'g, 683
F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982).
236. CAIrFORNIA COASTAL COMM'N, COASTAL ENERGY DEVELOPMENT: THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENcE,

A Guam FOR COASTAL LocAL GOVFRNmENTS 55 (1981) [hereinafter cited as COASTAL ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT].
237. Telephone interview with Paul Thayer, Legislative Coordinator, California Coastal Commission (Oct. 26, 1984).
238. Telephone interview with Tim Eichenberg, Staff Energy Counsel, California Coastal Commission (Oct. 26, 1984).
239. See S. REP. No. 277, supra note 221, at 1770.
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81 annual evaluation of California's management program, the federal
OCZM commended the state's efforts to implement consistency. 240 Cooperation and coordination with the National Park Service, the Coast
Guard, the Corps of Engineers, and the Navy were mentioned as examples
of outstanding progress."' On the other hand, the LCP process has yet
to be significantly affected by the federal consistency requirement, although federal consistency is measured in part against certified LCPs.
One explanation is that LCPs generally do not include land-use designations or mapping for federal lands.242
The promise to local governments that a certified LCP would give them
a voice in federal decisionmaking has been a "carrot" to encourage local
cooperation. It is not readily apparent whether this promise has been an
effective incentive. In those jurisdictions where OCS activity has historically taken place without meaningful local participation, it is likely that
the advantages of the consistency obligation are apparent. Even so, local
enthusiasm may be somewhat dampened because the state coastal commission represents local interest.
It is too early to determine the overall impact of the consistency obligation on California CZM. The record with OCS is, however, quite
positive. 243 The substance of particular coastal commission consistency
objections has not been appealed, and the effectiveness of voluntary
mediation is uncertain. It remains to be seen how effectively the commission will require federal conformity to local as well as to statewide
management policies.
The Washington Program
The federal consistency requirement was seen by Washington state
officials as providing an important opportunity for the state to influence
federal projects and programs. The reality of Washington's experience
with the consistency provision can best be understood by studying three
incidents:
1) The excluded lands dispute
When the State of Washington submitted its program for federal approval, a controversy ensued involving a section of the federal Act which
states:
240. OFFICE OF COASTAL

ZONE MANAGEMENT, SECTION 312 EVALUATION FINDINGS, THE CALIF-

ORNIA COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS FOR 1978-1979 (1979).

241. Id. at 4.
242. In the 1978-79 and 1979-80 OCZM evaluations, the commission was reminded that CZMA
directs federal lands that are excluded from the state's mangement and the LCP development process.
OCZM recommended that the commission instruct local governments to exclude federal lands from
their LCPs.
243. See Karp, supra note 232, at 2106.
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Excluded from the coastal zone are [l]ands the use of which is by
law subject solely to the discretion or of which is held in trust by
the Federal Government, its officers or agents.'
Washington felt that this provision should be interpreted narrowly, thereby
excluding only lands where the federal government had sole legislative
jurisdiction. The federal government interpreted the provision to exclude
all federal lands regardless of jurisdictional status. As a result, Washington
submitted a revision of its CZM program, which adopted an interim
position excluding all federal lands irrespective of jurisdictional status,
pending a Department of Justice opinion on the matter.245 The Washington
CZM program was subsequently approved, but the controversy over excluded lands continued.
On April 10, 1976, the State of Washington filed suit alleging that the
exclusion of all federal lands was contrary to the letter and intent of the
CZMA.24 6 The Department of Justice opinion requested by Washington
and NOAA stated that "the exclusionary clause excludes all lands owned
by the United States from the definition of coastal zone." 247 Because
many agencies interpreted this to exclude all lands owned, leased, or
otherwise used by the federal government, the opinion did little to clarify
the dispute. NOAA requested an additional clarifying opinion from the
Department, and that supplemental opinion now forms the basis of NOAA's
definition:
States must exclude from their coastal zone those lands owned,
leased, held in trust or whose use is otherwise by law subject to the
discretion of the Federal Government, its officers or agents. 4
Washington regulations 49 remain unchanged:
The permit system shall apply to developments undertaken on lands
not federally owned but under lease, easement, license, or other
similar federal property rights short of fee ownership to the federal
government.'5
The State of Washington, through the Department of Ecology, challenged NOAA's regulation in court, charging that the exclusion of all
federally owned or leased lands from the coastal zone was inconsistent
with the CZMA."Sl The district court found the regulation valid except
244. 16 U.S.C. § 1453(a) (1982).
245. Excluded Federal Lands Debated, Defined, 2 Shoreline/Coastal Zone Management No. 10,
1 (1978).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 15 C.F.R. § 923.33 (1980).
249. WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. § 173-14-062(3) (1983).
250. Id.
251. Washington v. United States, Civil No. C78-223v (W.D. Wash. filed Aug. 5, 1981).

January 19851

CZM IN CALIFORNIA

to the extent that it excluded federally leased lands from the "coastal
zone."252
The court is unable to conclude that use of all federally leased lands
is subject by law solely to the discretion of the . . .Federal Government .... Each lease will have to be analyzed to determine
whether use of the leased land is subject solely to the discretion of
the Federal Government. 3
Apparently, lands over which the federal government is either lessee or
lessor are covered by the court's opinion. In practice, there have been
few incidents testing the district court opinion. In 1983, however, the
Navy did apply for an SMA permit for a project on leased land adjacent
to the Naval facility at Oak Harbor. 4 This case should set a precedent
for future activity on federally leased land.
The "excluded lands" provision has aroused controversy, but perhaps
more important to the implementation of Washington's plan are the consistency provisions relating to federal licenses and permits. The naval
installations on the Olympic Peninsula are examples of developments on
land excluded from the Washington plan but subject to the Act's consistency provisions. 5 Construction of a magnetic silencing pier for use
by Trident submarines was proposed on land owned by the federal government. Although spillover effects, such as the loss of shellfish, were
associated with the project, the state agreed with the Navy that the facility
was consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the WCZMP.
2) Northern Tier Pipeline
A section of the CZMA has had broad applicability in Washington. 6
Many of the consistency determinations reviewed by the Department of
Ecology involve Army Corps of Engineers permits. Several permits issued
by the Corps to Northern Tier Inc. have been the subject of heated
controversy and several lawsuits. The DOE filed suit in U.S. District
Court, alleging that the permits issued for construction of a port and
pipeline were invalid. 7 The first cause of action in the suit by DOE
against the Corps alleged:
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Telephone interview with Jay Manning, Assistant Attorney General, Washington State (Oct.
26, 1984). In 1984 an additional "excluded lands" dispute arose involving a marina project on the
lands of the Tulalip Indian Tribe. The tribe claimed that the SMA permit process was not applicable
to their tribal lands. The marina project is now proceeding without an SMA permit. Id.
255. OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, WASHINGTON STATE PERFORMANCE WITH RESPECT
TO COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT-ANNUAL REVIEW AND ACTION MEMORANDUM 7 (1978).

256. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(C)(3)(A) (1982).
257. State Sues the Corps., Shoreline/Coastal Zone Mgmt., May 1, 1982, at 1; Washington v.
Northern Tier Pipeline Co., Civil No. C82-482v (W.D. Wash. 1982).
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Any applicant for a federal license to conduct an activity affecting
land or water in the coastal zone shall provide certification together
with any other necessary data and information that the proposed
activity is consistent with the state's CZM program."
The proposed project involved construction of a "superport" near Port
Angeles for transshipment of petroleum to northern tier states via a submerged pipeline under portions of Puget Sound. In accordance with Washington law, the Energy Facility and Site Evaluation Commission (EFSEC)
made a recommendation to the governor that the project permit be denied. 9 During the 60 days which Governor Spellman had to consider
the EFSEC recommendation and issue a final decision, the Corps issued
permits to Northern Tier, disregarding the EFSEC process. Governor
Spellman refused to approve the project on April 8, 1982.2" Northern
Tier responded with a lawsuit alleging various violations of the federal
constitution.261 Northern Tier also applied for a permit for a route around
instead of under Puget Sound.262 Issuance of a permit for this alternate
route could moot the litigation surrounding Northern Tier's original proposal. 263 After further months of investigation, Northern Tier in 1983
abandoned the pipeline project entirely, citing as reasons the continuing
hostility of the State of Washington, as well as lower oil prices.
3) Seismic Testing
A "memorandum of agreement" between the State of Washington and
the Department of the Interior was signed on June 1,

19 8 2

.2" The mem-

orandum outlined a procedure to avoid or minimize conflicts between
OCS seismic survey operations and state-managed fisheries resources. It
included details of a notification process by which the Pacific Outer
Continental Shelf Region of Interior's Minerals Management Service
alerts the state to proposed surveys.265 Also included were provisions for
258. Lawsuit Cites Four Causes ofAction, 6 Shoreline/Coastal Zone Mgmt., May 4, 1982, at 4.
259. For an extensive chronology of the EFSEC proceedings, from the filing of the Northern Tier
application for a permit in July, 1976, to the EFSEC negative recommendations on the project on
January 27, 1982, see J.D. Currie, Puget Sound and the Pipe (Nov. 1983) (Report 83-10, Washington
State Department of Ecology).
260. Northern Tier Decision "no surprise," Seattle Times, Apr. 9, 1982, at 1, col. 4. See also
Seattle Post Intelligencer, Apr. 9, 1982, at A-10, col. 1.
261. Northern Tier Pipeline Co. v. Spellman, Civil No. C82-548v (W.D. Wash. 1982).
262. Northern Tier Returns to EFSEC Taking a New Look at an Old Route, WASH. COASTAL
CURRENTS (Sept. 1, 1982).
263. See Washington v. Northern Tier Pipeline Co., Civil No. C82-482v (W.D. Wash. 1982);
Northern Tier Pipeline Co. v. Spellman, Civil No. C82-548v (W.D. Wash. 1982). See also In re
Application of Northern Tier Pipeline Co., Washington State Energy Facilities Site Evaluation
Council, Application No. 76-2.
264. Agreement Reached to void OCS Seismic SurveylFisheries Conflicts, 6 WASH. COASTAL
CuRRENTs No. 9, 4 (June 4 1982).
265. Id.
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state review of the proposed operation and a requirement that state comments and recommendations be incorporated into the permit, to avoid
conflicts.266
The necessity for the agreement became apparent after an incident in
December 1980, in which more than 1,250 crab pots were caught in a
cable and trailing equipment of the Geco Alpha, a vessel surveying federal
waters off Washington. The unfortunate incident resulted in economic
hardships to individual crab fishermen and a loss to the state's Dungeness
crab resource. Because crab pots are self-baiting, lost pots may continue
to fish for several years until they disintegrate. Although Interior entered
the Washington agreement, Oregon is treating the seismic testing crab
fishery conflict as a matter of federal consistency under the CZMA.
In Washington, federal consistency remains a confusing and controversial issue. The 1981 OCZM evaluation of the Washington coastal
management plan confirms the conclusion that problems continue to exist.
Local officials and public interest groups were still inadequately informed
about the federal consistency provisions and had misconceptions about
the purpose of these provisions and how they were to be used.267 In
response to this finding, OCZM suggested that the DOE engage in more
comprehensive educational efforts to alert officials and the public to the
relevance of the provisions.
Considering the leverage which consistency has provided in very recent
federal-state conflicts, it is unfortunate that it did not earlier rise to its
full potential in Washington. Consistency objections which Washington
raised to location of the Trident submarine base at Bangor, to construction
of a NOAA facility on the shores of Lake Washington, 26 to supertankers
larger than 125,000 dwt entering Puget Sound,2 69 and to location of an
oilport east of Port Angeles either were ineffectively raised by the state
or summarily dismissed by the federal agencies concerned.
The Oregon Program
In May 1977, the Secretary of Commerce approved Oregon's coastal
management program, 27 which became eligible to take advantage of the
benefits of federal consistency. As Oregon's designated coastal management agency, the LCDC has been charged with coordinating the consistency review process among all other state agencies and local
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id.
1981 EVALUATION FINDINGS, supra note 136, at 10.
See Save Lake Washington v. Frank, 641 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1981).
See Ray v. ARCO, 435 U.S. 151, 178 n.8 (1978).
E.g., OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, EVALUATION OF THE OREGON COASTAL

MANAGEMENT PROGRAM COVERING THE GRANT PERIOD JUNE THROUGH JUNE 1

(1979).
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governments.2 7 It is the only state agency now authorized to comment
officially on federal consistency determinations and to monitor federal
activities which affect Oregon's coastal zone. The LCDC may seek court
action or mediation by the Secretary of Commerce if it disagrees with a
federal agency's decision.272 The LCDC also has the responsibility to
mediate consistency conflicts between the federal and the state governments, after other state agencies have identified and submitted potential
conflicts for resolution.273 Three Oregon examples of the consistency
interplay between federal and state government are instructive:
1) The Sunset Cove EstuaryFill
Predictably, federal agencies were initially slow to respond to the consistency mandate. Some presumably were reluctant to surrender their
discretionary powers; others simply may have been slow to comprehend
the change in their own responsibilities under Oregon's coastal program.
The Sunset Cove case274 also illustrates confusion about the consistency
process at the state and local levels.
Late in 1968, a developer, Sunset Cove, Inc., without a required permit
from the Corps of Engineers, filled a total of 17 acres at Seaside, Oregon,
on the Necanicum sand spit, and in the Necanicum estuary itself. Planning
a residential development for the spit, Sunset Cove refused to apply for
an "after-the-fact" permit when pressured by the Corps, and the Corps
sued in federal court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the
developer to remove 500 feet of the length of the fill and to apply for an
after-the-fact permit for the remainder.275
As a result of the court order, Sunset Cove submitted its application
early in 1978, nearly 10 years after the fill was made. The Corps of
Engineers was prepared to grant the after-the-fact permit as a matter of
course. But 1000 Friends of Oregon, a statewide public interest group,
citing the federal consistency provisions of CZMA, reminded the Corps
of its federal consistency responsibilities and demanded a public hearing."' The hearing was held, and testimony disclosed that Sunset
Cove's
property lay on an active foredune subject to ocean flooding.277 A local
271. 15 C.F.R. § 930.54 (1984). The review procedure varies according to whether the federal
proposal is an "activity," a "grant," or a "license or permit." Various consistency review procedures
were adopted in 1978 and have been codified as OR. ADMIN. R. § 660 div. 31 (1984).
272. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(h) (1982).
273. Id.
274. Benner, Sunset Cove-"FederalConsistency" at Work, 4 1000 FRIEEDs oF OREGON NEwsLErrER
No. 2, 4 (1978).
275. Sunset Cove, Inc. v. United States, 514 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
865 (1975). See also Northwest Envtl. Defense Fund v. Bratton, 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1097,
1688 (D. Or. 1981) (consistency of jetty restoration at Nehalan Bay).
276. Benner, supra note 273, at 4.
277. Id.

January 1985]

CZM IN CALIFORNIA

builder testified that neither he nor any responsible builder would construct
residences on such an unstable site. In addition, LCDC's Beaches and
Dunes Goal prohibits residential development on active foredunes and
other foredunes subject to ocean flooding. It was at once apparent that
the developer's application was inconsistent with Oregon's coastal program.
Still, the Corps of Engineers was required to make such a determination
formally by applying to the appropriate local government or state agency
for a consistency review. The proposed development lay within the jurisdiction of the City of Seaside. Although Seaside had a comprehensive
plan, it had not yet been approved by LCDC as complying with the four
coastal goals. Consequently, the Corps had to apply to the appropriate
state agency for a determination of whether granting the permit was
consistent with Oregon's coastal goals.
Under LCDC's consistency rule the Division of State Lands (DSL)
was designated as the agency to make the consistency determinations in
fill situations.278 DSL, however, declined to require an after-the-fact permit because the fill had been made prior to the effective date of the state
legislation which transferred fill permit authority to DSL.279 The task of
consistency determination thus fell on LCDC. Ultimately, the Corps denied an after-the-fact permit, in part, because the project was inconsistent
with three goals of the Oregon Coastal Management Program.
2) Seismic Testing
In November 1981,2"' the chairman of LCDC issued a determination
that seismic testing off the Oregon coast, being conducted under a federal
geophysical exploration permit, was inconsistent with Oregon's coastal
" '
management program in that it interfered with deep-sea crab fishing.28
Unfortunately, the particular test was completed and the damage to crab
pots had already occurred before OCZM and Interior responded to LCDC's
determination.
On June 15, 1983, the Department of Land Conservation and Development negotiated a "Memorandum of Agreement" with the Department
of Interior.282 The agreement is similar to one recently concluded in
Washington to resolve future OCS seismic testing-fisheries conflicts. According to one LCDC official, the agreement has been successful in
preventing conflicts with Oregon fishermen.283
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id.; Telephone interview with Don Oswalt, Plan Review Specialist, LCDC (Oct. 25, 1984).
Id.
See 15 C.F.R. § 930.54 (1984).
Geophysical seismic testing off the Oregon Coast, 4 OR. COAsT No. 4, 2 (1981).
Telephone interview with Dick Matthews, Coastal Program Manager, LCDC (Oct. 25, 1984).
Id.
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3) OCS oil and gas development
In the dispute between the Department of the Interior and the Pacific
Coast states about oil and gas lease sales on the OCS, Oregon was less
vocal in its opposition than its neighboring states have been. The Department of Interior's position was that "pre-lease activities" were merely
preliminary, and not activities directly affecting a state's coastal zone.284
In January 1981, LCDC adopted a staff report opposing the Department
of Interior's position.2 85 The report offered recommendations on how OCS
lease sales could be undertaken in a manner consistent with Oregon's
coastal management plan. Oregon's governor transmitted the report the
following month to Secretary Watt, requesting a consistency determination be made at the time of final notice of sale. 6 The United States
ultimately ruled in Interior's favor in a similar dispute in
Supreme Court
28 7
California.
In general, consistency reviews have been running more smoothly in
Oregon than in its neighboring coastal states, despite the initial slowness
of federal agencies to respond to their new responsibilities under Oregon's
coastal management program. Once LCDC formulated and promulgated
a review procedure in the form of an administrative rule, consistency
conflicts have usually been resolved with a minimum of difficulty. Oregon
has not yet offered any instance of consistency conflicts which simultaneously are unique to the state and constitute an exemplary test of the
federal consistency provisions of the CZMA. The greatest short-term
challenge to the consistency provisions will most likely come from federal
permits related to oil exploration and development on the OCS. Oregon
will share this challenge with its sister states of California, Washington,
and Alaska.
DEVELOPMENT IN HAZARDOUS COASTAL AREAS
Introduction
Stimulated in part by changes in the federal CZMA, there has been a
growing emphasis in coastal zone management on regulating development
in hazardous coastal areas. In 1976, the Act was amended to require that
state CZM programs contain a planning process for shoreline erosion
problems.2 88 In addition, the 1980 CZMA amendments state that programs
should manage coastal development to minimize the loss of life and
284. See Secretary of Interior v. California, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
285. The staff report was a Section 307 consistency review drafted by Jon Christensen. The report
was adopted by LCDC on January 30, 1981. Telephone interview with Jon Christensen, former
Manager, Oregon Coastal Energy Impact Program (Oct. 25, 1984).
286. Id.
U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
287. See Secretary of Interior v. California, 288. 16 U.S.C. § 1454(b)(9) (1982).
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property caused by improper development in areas susceptible to floods,
storm surges, geological hazards, and erosion. 8 9 Management efforts
already underway in California, Washington, and Oregon were strengthened in response to these changes. While local implementation of hazard
management policies is just beginning, some predictions about the likelihood of its success are derivable from the states' experience with coastal
hazards management to date.
BCDC
The McAteer-Petris Act mandates that any fill placed in San Francisco
Bay "afford reasonable protection to persons and property against the
hazards of unstable geologic or soil conditions or of flood or storm waters. "'
The San Francisco Bay Plan includes findings and policies with regard
to development in hazardous areas. Risks associated with destructive
seismic activity are a primary consideration. BCDC policies are particularly directed at reducing the risks to life and property from developments
located on fill.29 Recognizing that safety depends on the procedures and
materials used to fill, the plan requires investigation of potential hazards
and consideration of special design conditions. 92 Because sufficient data
are not available specifying general minimum construction standards, the
plan directs that a board of consulting civil engineers, geologists, structural engineers, and similar professionals shall review projects to establish
development criteria and inspection programs. 9 This Engineering Criteria Review Board determines seismic risk and recommends to BCDC
permit conditions necessary to ensure that risks to life and property are
reduced to acceptable levels.
Hazards to development from flooding and subsidence also are specifically addressed by the plan.294 Elevated building pads and dikes are
mentioned in the plan as construction techniques which can be required
to minimize risks of damage from these hazards. The Engineering Criteria
Review Board may recommend such construction and design conditions.
The Board is empowered to recommend that permit applications be denied
cannot be safely developed within the policy limits of the
if projects
295
plan.
289. Id. § 1452(2)(B).
290. CAL. Pu. Ras. CODE §66605(e) (West 1983).
291. SAN FRANcisco BAY CONSERVATION AND DEv. COMM'N, SAN FRANcisco BAY PLAN 15

(1969).
292. Id.
293. Id. at 17.
294. Id.
295. Telephone interview with Russell A. Abramson, Associate Executive Director, San Francisco
Bay Conservation and Development Commission (Sept. 10, 1982).
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The CaliforniaProgram
Proposition 20 provided that all permits were subject to reasonable
conditions to ensure the minimization of danger of floods, landslides,
erosion, siltation, or failure in the event of earthquake. 96 The 1975 California Coastal Plan recognized the hazards of flooding, earthquake fault
zones (and other seismic risks), tsunami run-up, unstable soils, and cliffs
and bluffs subject to landslides.297 Policies regarding hazards included
restricting development in flood hazard areas (Policy 64); improving geologic hazards programs (Policy 65); requiring recordation of geologic
hazards information (Policy 66); regulating new developments for geologic safety (Policy 67); eliminating public subsidies for development in
hazardous areas (Policy 68); establishing measures for tsunami preparedness (Policy 69); and regulating bluff and cliff developments for geologic safety (Policy 70).29S
The California Coastal Commission has developed guidelines for geologic stability of blufftop development.299 The guidelines provide that in
order to meet the requirements of the Act, bluff and cliff developments
must minimize alteration of natural landforms and assure stability and
structural integrity.3"° Retaining walls or sea walls will be allowed only
when required to maintain public recreational areas or public services,
or to protect port areas or principal structures in existing developments
from erosion damage.3"' Furthermore, geologic report and investigation
are required for developments in what the guidelines refer to as the "area
of demonstration. 302z This area is defined as the base, face, and top of
all bluffs and cliffs. The "area of demonstration" extends inland 50 feet
from the face of the bluff or to the point where a line would intersect the
blufftop if drawn at a 200 angle from the top of the bluff, whichever is
296. California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 27403(d) (repealed 1977).
297. CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMM'N, STATEWIDE INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES
83 (1981) [hereinafter cited as INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES]. The Coastal Act deals with development
in hazardous areas, in § 30253:
New development shall:
(1) Minimize risks to life and property in areas of high geologic, flood, and fire
hazard.
(2) Assure stability and structural integrity, and neither create nor contribute significantly to erosion, geologic instability, or destruction of the site or surrounding
area or in any way require the construction of protective devices that would
substantially alter natural land forms along bluffs and cliffs.
298. Oil and gas development conditions include CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30262(e) (West 1983)
which declares that "such development will not cause or contribute to subsidence hazards unless it
is determined that adequate measures will be undertaken to prevent damage from such subsidence."
299. INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES, supra note 294, at 1.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 2.
302. Id.
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greater.3"3 The applicant has the burden of showing that proposed development will not create geologic hazard or diminish stability.3 "4 The geologic report must be prepared by a registered geologist, a civil engineer
with expertise in soils or foundation engineering, or a certified engineering
geologist.3 5 The report must include the geologist's professional opinion
as to whether the project would be subject to or contribute to significant
geologic instability throughout its life.3" 6 In areas of geologic hazard, the
commission can require the applicant to sign a waiver of public liability
for any damage which might result to the development.3 7
In addition, the California "Local Coastal Program Manual" defines
"geologic hazards"3 8 and directs that local land use plans contain consistent policies regarding geologic, flood, and fire hazards and designation
of appropriate land use categories for areas subject to those hazards. Plans
must also impose setback or review criteria for bluff and cliff developments. 3" The zoning portion of the manual explains that while the 1976
Coastal Act does not specify which uses may be allowed in hazard areas,
the land-use plan must determine what types and intensities of uses meet
the mandate to minimize risks.310
The local land-use plan also should determine the degree of hazard
which bluff or cliff areas pose for development, and the plan should
indicate the appropriate type and intensities of uses to be permitted or
conditionally allowed. 3" ' The manual also declares that local ordinances
must require adequate site data from project applicants and impose appropriate setbacks and other safeguards. It also recognizes that some
conditions "may be so restrictive that no development is allowed." '
Local governments are employing a variety of techniques in their LCPs
to minimize the risks of hazards in new developments. Overlay zones,
setbacks, special review criteria, and geologic reporting procedures have
all been used.3" 3
Prior to LCP approval, the commission had relied heavily on permit
conditions to minimize hazard risks. Setbacks, revegetation requirements,
floodplain restrictions, waivers of liability, and deed restrictions have
been imposed as permit conditions. Deed restrictions are recorded and,
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMM'N, LOCAL PROGRAM MANUAL 11-27 (1977).
Id. at 11-28.
Id. at Z-19.
Id. at Z-20.
Id.
See Hildreth, CoastalNatural HazardsManagement, 59 OR. L. REv. 201, 223-30 (1980).
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thus, binding on the permit applicant and successors in interest. Typically,
a deed restriction provides that the applicant understands that the site in
question is subject to extraordinary hazards from erosion, seismic shaking,
etc.; assumes the risk of those hazards; unconditionally waives public
liability for any damage from the hazards; and understands that public
funds
may be unavailable for repair or replacement should damage oc3 14
cur.

The foregoing approaches apply only to new development. In 1979,
the legislature amended the Coastal Act to exempt from the permit process
replacement of structures destroyed by natural disaster.315 Severe winter
storms in 1977-78 had destroyed or damaged many homes in Southern
California, and property owners, fearing the commission would not allow
rebuilding or would apply strict conditions, lobbied for this exemption.
Although at first glance the exemption seems fair, it eliminates the commission's ability to prevent or even minimize risks in existing developments.
Prior to Proposition 20, it was not unusual for structures to be built
within a few feet of eroding bluff faces.3 16 Californians are familiar with
stories of beachfront homes destroyed by erosion damage, cliff retreat,
and soil failure.3" 7 Observers who were asked about regulation of development in hazardous areas subsequent to Proposition 20 and the 1976
Coastal Act unhesitatingly agreed that risks from hazards have been minimized, and developments made safer.3" 8 While supportive empirical evidence may be lacking, even commission critics agree that the quality of
development has improved greatly with respect to hazards exposure.3" 9
Zoning, permit conditions, and deed restrictions for hazard areas are
not new techniques, but the amount and quality of information required
from applicants for development permission is new. Other, less common
techniques, such as transfer of development credits and waivers of liability, also may be effective in achieving the Coastal Act goal of minimizing risks, while removing the coastal commission and local governments
from difficult choices of allowing imprudent development or prohibiting
development altogether.
314. Sample of conditions for permit in hazard area provided by commission staff, Aug. 1982.
315. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 30610(9) (amended by 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 919).
316. Kuhn & Shepard, Coastal Erosion in San Diego County, California, in 3 COASTAL ZONF
'80 1899 (B. Edge ed. 1982).
317. Three houses were destroyed in Santa Barbara in 1978 after rains triggered the failure of
an historic landslide area.
318. Reflects comments made by M. Fischer, Executive Director, California Coastal Commission;
N. Schwartz, Chairperson, California Coastal Commission; Phil Mees, Director, Southern Central
District of California Coastal Commission.
319. This is the authors' opinion.
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The Washington Program
Coastal erosion is not perceived as a critical problem in Washington
for essentially two reasons. First, only a small percentage of the coastline
is exposed to the high energy waves of the Pacific Ocean. Second, the
exposed areas are relatively uninhabited.
Although Washington's marine coastline extends for 2,337 miles, 80
percent of this coastline lies within the more sheltered waters of Puget
Sound, Strait of Georgia, and the Strait of Juan de Fuca. The erosion
problems on these shorelines are less significant than those on the Pacific
coastline, where storm waves of 25 feet are not uncommon. On the
northern two-thirds of the coastline, erosion presents little difficulty because the coastline consists of steeply sloped, rocky beaches with uplands
which are predominantly uninhabited. The more populated southern onethird of the coastline is still very rural and consists mainly of wide, sandy
beaches with extensive dunes. It is in this southern region where erosion
problems are most severe. The Washington CZM program designates two
segments of this coastline as areas of particular concern. Both lie near
Willapa Bay; Cape Shoalwater and Toke Point. The only other area in
the state designated as an area of particular concern is Ediz Hook in the
Strait of Juan de Fuca.
Inside Puget Sound erosion problems are less severe. Even during
storms, waves rarely exceed four or five feet in height. Nonetheless, the
natural erosion and accretion processes continue and can, at times, create
problems for shorefront buildings. Many shorefront residents have constructed erosion defense structures in order to maintain their beaches.
These structures interfere with the natural flow of beach sediment and
are usually less than attractive. Many owners of existing structures will
have to continue the battle to protect their property. It should be possible,
however, to require that future structures locate a safe distance from the
shoreline. Aside from wave related erosion, several areas in Washington's
coastal zone are susceptible to ground failure. Such conditions can be
found in several hillsides and coastal bluffs overlooking Puget Sound.
The problem is compounded by earthquakes, where soil failure is a secondary, but still hazardous effect. Several large earthquakes have occurred
in Washington,32 especially in the Puget Sound Basin. Therefore, the
" '
potential for future damage is very real. 32
320. Rasmussen & Grossen, A Review of Earthquake Hazards in the Coastal Zone of Washington
State, in NATURAL HAZARDS IN WASHINGTON'S COASTAL ZONE-AN ANTHOLOGY OF RECENT ARTICLES
3 (F. Wilcox ed. 1979).
321. The Coastal Atlas developed by the Department of Ecology identifies areas susceptible to
ground failure hazards. See WASHINGTON STATF DEP'T. OF ECOLOGY, COASTAL ZONE ATLAS OF
WASHINGTON (1977-80).
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The generally noncritical nature of erosion problems has undoubtedly
colored Washington's efforts in this area of CZM. Several authorities
have been responsible for the management of erosion related problems.
Local governments-including cities, counties, port districts, and flood
control districts-are authorized to raise revenues to manage erosion
impacts. The Corps of Engineers provides studies and programs aimed
at ameliorating erosion damage. After the 1976 amendments to the federal
CZMA, these scattered attempts to manage erosion took on a more organized form. A planning element for controlling and mitigating shoreline
erosion was incorporated into the Washington program.
The Shoreline Management Act refers only indirectly to avoidance of
coastal hazards.322 Furthermre, proper management of development in
hazardous areas is undercut by several exemptions to the shoreline development permit procedure. These include construction on wetlands of
single family residences, construction of normal protective bulkheads,
and emergency construction necessary to protect property from damage
by the elements. 3" These exemptions allow the construction of homes
without adequate setbacks and uncoordinated construction of shoreline
protective structures.
The regulations promulgated to implement the Shoreline Management
Act contain more detailed reference to erosion problems. The regulations
recognize that erosion caused by agriculture, forestry, mining, and residential development can adversely affect coastal resources. Local governments are urged to address erosion in their shoreline master programs.324
Residential developers in particular should be required to indicate how
they plan to control erosion during construction. 3"
The regulations also recognize that improper construction of breakwaters, jetties, groins, and landfills can cause shoreline erosion which
leads to further construction of shoreline protective devices such as bulkheads and seawalls.326 Although normal protective bulkheading is exempt
from the shoreline management permit process, the builder must apply
to the local jurisdiction for a letter of exemption.327 Generally, exemptions
322. The provisions of the Shoreline Management Act do not specifically address coastal hazards.
Instead, coastal hazards are referred to indirectly as in the statutes policy provision which provides
in part: "This policy contemplates protecting against adverse effects to the public health, the land
and its vegetation .... "WASH. Rev. CODE §90.58.020 (1983).
323. WASH. REv. CODE §90.58.030(e)(ii),(iii),(vi) (1981).
324. WASH. ADMIN CODE R. §§ 173-16-040(4)(d)(ii), 173-16-060 (1983).
325. Id. 99 173-16-060(11)-(14).
326. For areas with severe problems, WASH ADMIN CODE R § 17316-040(4)(b)(ii) (1983) states:
The conservancy environment would ... be the most suitable designation for those
areas which present too severe biophysical limitations to be designated as rural or
urban environments. Such limitations would include areas of steep slopes presenting
ero sion and slide hazards, and areas prone to flooding.
327. WASH. REv. CODE §90.58.030(ii) (1983); Telephone interview with William Obert, Shorelands Planner, Washington State Department of Ecology (Sept. 3, 1982).
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are granted so long as the bulkhead is built to prevent erosion. In most
cases, the local jurisdiction will allow builkheading if adjoining landowners have already constructed bulkheads.328
The Oregon Program
One of the few outright prohibitions of Oregon's coastal goals concerns
development on ocean beaches and active foredunes. Goal 18, the Beaches
and Dunes Goal, provides:
[lI]ocal governments and state and federal agencies shall prohibit
residential developments and commercial and industrial buildings on
active foredunes, and on other foredunes which are conditionally
stable and that are subject to ocean undercutting or wave overtopping,
and on interdune areas (deflation plains) that are subject to ocean
flooding. Other development in these areas shall be permitted only
if [findings required elsewhere in the goal are made] . . . and it is
demonstrated that the proposed development:
(a) is adequately protected from any ecological hazards, wind
erosion, undercutting, ocean flooding and storm waves; or is
of minimal value; and
(b) is designed to minimize adverse environmental effects.329
Goal 18 also prohibits the issuance of permits for shoreline protective
devices for post-1976 development. The impact of this prohibition, however, was dampened by an administrative interpretation treating subdivided, but undeveloped, lots as existing development. Even so, controversial
1981 lots-of-record legislation does not exempt from regulation singlefamily homes constructed on lots designated in a county comprehensive
plan as being in a floodplain or a geographical hazard area.33
Goal 17, the Shorelands Goal, addresses reducing the hazard to life
and property, and provides that nonstructural solutions to erosion and
flooding problems are preferred to structural solutions. Goal 7, Areas
Subject to Natural Disasters and Hazards, though not itself a coastal goal,
supplements the requirements of Goals 17 and 18. Goal 7 provides:
328. Telephone interview with William Obert, supra note 326.
329. See STATE-WIDE PLANNING GOALS, supra note 42, at Goal 18, implementation requirement
(2). An active foredune is defined as "[a]n unstable barrier ridge of sand paralleling the beach and
subject to wind erosion, water erosion, and growth from new sand deposits." Conditionally stable
foredunes are active foredunes that have "ceased growing in height and [have] . . . become conditionally stable with regard to wind erosion." Examples of development of "minimal value" include
boardwalks, fences which do not affect sand erosion or migration, and temporary open-sided shelters.
It was the original intention of the former Oregon Coastal Conservation and Development Commission
that a site investigation report be required where development is proposed for a questionable location,
but such a report has been demoted to the status of a nonobligatory "guideline."
330. 1981 Or.' Laws ch. 884, §§ 9-13; Hildreth, Laws Regulating Ocean Shore Development, in
SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS: LEGAL IssuEs AND LIABILrrY FOR CONSTRUCION ALONG THE OCEAN SHORE

(1982) (the published papers from a seminar conducted Feb. 23, 1982 in Newport, Oregon).
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Developments subject to damage or that could result in loss of life
shall not be planned or located in known areas of natural disasters
and hazards without appropriate safeguards. Plans shall be based on
" '
an inventory of known areas of natural disaster and hazards. 33
The three goals govern both issuance of permits for shoreline protective
devices under the state's Ocean Shore Protection and Fill and Removal
Laws and the preparation of local comprehensive plans and implementing
ordinances. Oregon's coastal cities and counties are responding with
appropriate plan provisions and a variety of regulatory techniques, including mandatory setbacks, hazard overlay zoning, site-specific geologic
report requirements, and awarding development density bonuses to developers who avoid hazardous areas.332 Three controversial developments
in hazardous coastal areas illustrate the impact of Oregon's coastal hazard
management strategy.
1) The Breakers Point condominium development
On November 3, 1976, the city council of Cannon Beach, a popular
Oregon seaside resort town, voted to permit construction of a 97 unit
condominium on an unstable foredune at Breakers Point, just north of
Elk Creek within the city limits. Over the unanimous opposition of the
city's planning commission, the city issued the permit on December 28,
only three days before the four Coastal Goals were scheduled to take
effect. Within 48 hours bulldozers were on the site, although only a small
amount of grading ultimately occurred.
Members of the overruled planning commission joined with 20 residents of Cannon Beach and 1000 Friends of Oregon in petitioning the
Clatsop County Circuit Court for a writ of review. Shortly thereafter, the
LCDC brought a similar suit against the City of Cannon Beach through
an assistant attorney general of Oregon, asking for a ruling that the
Beaches and Dunes Goal, adopted December 12, 1976, and effective
January 1, 1977, be applied to the proposed development.333
The litigation came to an end more than a year later. In April 1978,
the LCDC agreed to dismiss its suit against the developer and the city in
331. Areas of natual disasters and hazards are defined as "areas that are subject to natural events
that are known to result in death or endanger the works of man, such as stream flooding, ocean
flooding, ground water, erosion, and deposition, landslides, earthquakes, weak foundation soils and
other hazards unique to local and regional areas." STATEWIDE PLANNING GoALS, supra note 42, at
23. The State Land Conservation and Development Commission's policy is that no Goal 2 exceptions
which increase the hazard to life and property contrary to the mandates of Goals 7, 17, and 18 are
allowed.
332. See Hildreth, supra note 287, at 228.
333. State v. City Council of Cannon Beach, Civil No. CC 77-142 (1977). 1000 Friends and its
co-litigants sought to intervene in the State's suit. When the motion to intervene was denied, they
filed a separate suit and sought a consolidation.
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return for the city's assurance that it would make findings on Goal 18
requirements on all permits issued after the effective date of the Goals.
Three months later, 1000 Friends of Oregon and its partners in litigation
signed a more exacting agreement in return for dropping suit. The city
agreed to apply all Goal 18 requirements to the development site, to
revoke permits issued for 44 units planned for construction on an active
foredune, and to limit development to stable portions of the property, as
334
determined by a site survey conducted by a professional geologist.
2) The Salishan Spit development
A narrow sandspit locally known as "Salishan" separates the Pacific
Ocean from Siletz Bay, the estuary where the Siletz River meets the sea.
Owing in part to the unusually large size of the sand grains on the spit,
shoreline changes have been frequent and sometimes drastic. In the late
1960s, a developer platted the sandspit, sold lots, and constructed a resort
lodge nearby. 335 Although historic shoreline changes on the spit were
wellknown to local residents, lot owners began to construct expensive
houses on the shorefront.
During the winter of 1970-71, severe storms eroded the high tide line
inland as much as 300 feet, threatening to breach the spit. The 15 or so
homes which had already been constructed were hastily protected with
riprap. During the following winter, however, storms concentrated beachfront erosion on the remaining unprotected shoreline, carrying away completely one partially built house. Other homes were saved only by hurriedly
dumped riprap. In 1974, a riprap seawall was built to protect the most
heavily eroded lots, and bulldozers restored them to their original dimensions with beach sand.336 For now, the shoreline protection strategy
at Salishan Spit seems to have arrested further erosion.
The repercussions of the events at Salishan lingered on beyond the
effective date of the coastal goals. The questions remained unanswered:
who pays for the damage, and who is responsible for necessary protection
measures? The statewide planning goals had nothing to say on that issue,
but in two landmark decisions of 1977 and 1978 the Oregon Supreme
Court ruled that the developer may be held liable under certain conditions.
In Cook v. Salishan Properties, the court held that a developer may
be held negligent in failing to make adequate investigation of the land's
fitness for residential development and in failing to warn prospective
334. Benner, Agreement Keeps Breakers Point Condo Off Foredune, 3 1000 FRIENDS OF OREGON
NEwsLEtrrE 4 (1978).

335. See Beri, Inc. v. Salishan Properties Inc., 282 Or. 569, 580 P.2d 903 (1978).
336.OREGON STATE SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION COMM'N, INVENTORY: OREGON COASTAL

SHoREanw

EROSION 66-68 (1978) [hereinafter cited as COASTAL EROSION].
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purchasers of erosion danger.337 In a companion case, Beri v. Salishan
Properties-itselfa consolidation of 20 individual suits against the developers-the court reaffirmed its decision of the previous year. The court
held that there was no reason why a professional land developer may not
be responsible for losses to purchasers caused by the developer's failure
to take reasonable precautions to determine the fitness for the intended
purposes of the offered lots.338 All of this occurred while Oregon's coastal
management program was in the development stage. Now that the program is in place, it is unlikely that the Salishan experience will be repeated, at least for development begun after the coastal goals went into
effect in 1977, because Goal 18 strictly prohibits residential development
on active foredunes. Indeed, it may be that the dramatic fate of some of
the Salishan homes gave an impetus to the prohibition.
3) Development at Jumpoff Joe
On Nye Beach, within the city limits of Newport, Oregon, lies one of
the most spectacular examples of coastal erosion in the United States.
The site is called "Jumpoff Joe," after a local legend. When first described
in the 19th Century, it was a narrow peninsula, jutting hundreds of feet
into the Pacific. By the early part of this century, the peninsula had
dwindled into a nearshore seastack. Today it is a barely noticeable promontory, flanked by gullies where the ocean has eroded into adjoining
seabluffs. The remains of a city street disappear abruptly into one of the
gullies.
Just south of Jumpoff Joe lie several acres where a landslide destroyed
more than a dozen homes in December 1943, carrying them toward and
on to the beach. The seabluffs surrounding this slide have retreated some
240 feet between 1939 and 1973, an average of more than seven feet per
year.339 Jumpoff Joe and its environs easily qualify as one of the most
active and unstable landforms on the Oregon coast, other than beaches,
dunes, and sandspits.
In mid-1981, Newport residents were surprised to find bulldozers grading the site of the 1943 landslide. In April 1981, the owners of the property
had applied for and obtained tentative plan approval from the Newport
337. 279 Or. 333, 569 P.2d 1033 (1977). The court declined, however, to extend the doctrine
of implied warranty of fitness from structures to the land itself. It had earlier ruled that an implied
warranty of fitness accompanies the sale of a new house. Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d
1019 (1974).
338. 282 Or. 569, 580 P.2d 173 (1978). The Beri court also declined to extend the implied
warranty of fitness. See also Salishan Proprties, Inc. v. Lincoln County, Civil No. 38823 (Lincoln
County Cir. Ct. filed Feb. 28, 1978) (allowing continued construction on lots in the Salishan
develoopment based on the undeveloped lot owners' investment in the development's common
facilities.
339. COASTAL EROSION, supra note 336, at 69.
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Planning Commission for the development of 39 residential lots.3" The
developers proposed to construct a 900-foot-long seawall to stabilize the
site for construction. Learning of the impending development, local opponents organized the "Friends of Lincoln County" and appealed to the
planning commission to reconsider their approval, charging that the development violated the statewide planning goal on Open Spaces, Scenic
and Historic Areas, Natural Resources, and Goals 7, 17, and 18 discussed
above. 34' When the planning commission refused to rescind approval, the
organization prepared to take its case to the Land Use Board of Appeals
(LUBA), a quasi-judicial agency created by the 1979 legislature to hear
land use disputes.342
The appeal of Friends of Lincoln County to LUBA was mooted when
the Oregon Division of State Lands (DSL) denied the developer's application for a seawall permit.343 As of September 1982, the original
development plan for the slide area had been abandoned. Construction
is still being planned, however, for dwellings at the tops of seabluffs
adjoining the landslide. Presumably an appropriate setback is planned,
although it is difficult to imagine that setbacks alone could protect residential development on these particularly hazardous landforms.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
All four West Coast CZM programs were established, and are being
implemented, over the vigorous and persistent opposition of two of the
more powerful lobbying groups in state politics, real estate developers
and local governments. Enactment and implementation in the face of such
potent opposition can be attributed to a remarkably broad public activism.
The public saw the all-too-visible changes in beaches and coastal areas
brought about by new housing, industrial development, and port expansion. Losses in recreational and aesthetic experiences imposed by these
activities were personal losses to many. If changes were not made in the
management system, cherished coastal areas would be permanently altered. The quality of life would be diminished.
Voters in Washington and California had to place great pressure on
their elected representatives to enact the desired coastal management laws.
340. Moore, Controversy at Jump Off Joe, Oregon Business 22 (July 1981).
341. Actually, the goals appear not to prohibit development such as this, provided the proper
precautions are taken. Some see this as a major shortcoming of the goals.
342. OR. REv. STAT. § 197.810 (1983).
343. Earlier there had been some question whether the proposed seawall might lie beyond the
jurisdiction of DSL, since its jurisdictional boundary is statutorily defined as a tide line on the beach,
OR. REv. STAT. § 541.605 (1984), and the ocean had years ago eroded the sea cliffs back beyond
the jurisdictional boundary-a telling example, perhaps, of how geological processes may overtake
legislative ones. DSL, however, assumed jurisdiction when it determined that to be structurally
sound the seawall would have to be placed at least partly within the tide line.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

The voters felt that state and local officials were far too solicitous of
developers' interests and were also overly concerned about tax bases.
Local officials failed to recognize the cumulative impacts of coastal developments and did not adequately consider recreational, environmental,
and regional interests in planning and zoning. The public recognized that
public bodies, such as airport, port, and sewer control agencies, were
among the more serious degraders of beaches and coastal areas. In order
to protect coastal areas from inappropriate development, the public had
to become involved directly in the political process, either through the
initiative process or intense lobbying.
Although the four CZM programs which emerged from this process
are exceptionally comprehensive, significant differences exist among them.
Often these differences reflect a tradeoff between what coastal protection
groups wanted and what they thought was politically possible.
BCDC was created entirely outside the existing state and local government structure as a new regional land and water-use management
agency. At first it was feared that BCDC's independence might make it
more vulnerable to attacks by state agencies and local governments whose
turf had been invaded by the new organization. BCDC has been able,
however, to resist such attacks. It has survived virtually unscathed and
remains a strong and effective institution. Much of its strength can be
attributed to its limited jurisdiction, only 100 feet inland, and limited
goals of stopping the filling of the Bay and enhancing public access.
These limited jurisdictional and goal attributes combine with the high
visibility of the Bay and make it easy for the public to detect violations.
In contast, the voters of the State of California and the Oregon legislature both chose to adopt wide jurisdictional bases for the state coastal
zone program-extending several miles inland on some portions of the
coast-and a wide-ranging set of goals, including such controversial
issues as wetlands and farmland preservation. Partly for these reasons,
California and Oregon have had considerably more difficulty in maintaining a supportive consensus and in achieving full implementation.
Washington, on the other hand, followed the lead of BCDC in providing
a limited jurisdictional area for its coastal management program-only
200 feet inland. Partly for this reason, Washington has succeeded in
implementing its CZM program more than California and Oregon. All
of Washington's local coastal programs have been approved and currently
are in operation.
Other important differences aided Washington's successful implementation. One difference was that an existing line agency, the Department
of Ecology, rather than a new independent commission as in California
and Oregon, was given state level responsibility for administering the
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program. Another difference was that local governments participated from
the outset in the development of the statewide coastal zone plan.
By way of contrast, in California a new, independent state commission,
with a cluster of regional commissions, initially administered the program
at both state and local levels. Between 1972 and 1976, the state commission developed a comprehensive statewide coastal zone plan and set
of goals with little input from local governments. In the 1976 Coastal
Act, the legislature provided that administration and enforcement be returned to local governments, but local governments were slow to accept
that responsibility. A key reason was that local governments were not the
principal creators or shapers of the plans which they were asked to enforce.
One strength of both the BCDC and California programs was that the
interim regulatory and long-range planning functions were combined in one
agency. The agencies used their regulatory powers to avoid foreclosure of
planning options, while the difficult issues they faced in the regulatory process tended to make their long-range planning more realistic.
Oregon's LCDC, on the other hand, was given no permit authority
over coastal development which might have facilitated LCDC's administration of the planning process and provided interim program enforcement. Furthermore, through a combination of legislative direction and
administrative choice, LCDC has administered local coastal planning as
part of Oregon's larger statewide land use planning program. This adversely affected implementation of CZM in Oregon in several ways. Local
implementation of the four coastal planning goals was delayed while
coastal local governments grappled with other aspects of the statewide
land use planning process. Federal CZM funds were used to carry out
the statewide land use program generally rather than CZM specifically.
Washington's successful implementation has come at a distinct cost,
as is illustrated by the "adjacent lands" controversy. The Washington
program was approved by the federal OCZM with the understanding that
the state somehow would exercise coordinated management control over
lands adjacent to the narrow 200 foot strip directly covered by the Shoreline Management Act. It was feared that uncontrolled development on
these adjacent lands could overwhelm planning for the shoreline under
the Shoreline Management Act. OCZM finally approved the Washington
program on the basis of the state's argument that it would adopt a networking process to regulate these adjacent lands, through the combined
use of the Washington Environmental Policy Act, 3" the Water Pollution
Control Act,345 the Shoreline Management Act,346 and other state laws.
344. WASH.REv. CODE §43.21C (1983).
345. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.48 (1983).
346. Id. § 90.58 (1983).
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This system has not worked well in practice. OCZM consistently has
criticized Washington's failure to develop an effective management program for these adjacent lands. Likewise, BCDC's San Francisco Bay
preservation efforts remain vulnerable to activities occurring on uplands
just beyond BCDC's 100 foot jurisdiction.
A central element of all four West Coast coastal zone programs is the
policy that developments on shorelines and in tidal and submerged areas
should not be allowed unless they are "water-dependent," a phrase that
has caught wide public attention and broad support in the adoption of
these programs. "Water-dependent" has been described as a policy that
would allow the location of marinas or ports in coastal waters because
they "have" to be on the water, but would deny such locations to restaurants, apartment houses, and businesses which do not require direct
water access. Like many thumbnail statements of complex concepts, the
application of this policy posed problems.
What has gradually emerged from experience is that the water-dependency concept describes a priority rather than an absolute rule. Few,
if any, activities are absolutely water-dependent. Marinas can be located
on uplands adjacent to the water by stacking boats in bins six or eight
stories high and using elevators to take them up or down. Such facilities
are less aestheticlly pleasing than the standard "dock" marina, and boaters
find them inconvenient. They are, however, economically feasible and
are now in wide use. While restaurants do not functionally require direct
access to the water, they sometimes acquire special charm and ambience
when located over water and thus provide a valuable service to the public.
Certain businesses, such as industries, airfields, and sewage disposal
plants, might also justifiably be 16cated on fills or over water because of
their public value or the high cost of locating them inland.
Successful implementation of the water-dependency concept requires
a strong monitoring and enforcement effort above the local government
level. For San Francisco Bay, BCDC has provided the necessary effort,
while in Washington, the state Shorelines Hearing Board and the courts
have played similar roles. Despite the federal CZMA's mandate for planning coastal land and water uses, only BCDC has fully coordinated shoreline management with water surface area management.
Since 1974, federal funding has provided a major incentive for state
implementation of CZM. An example of this influence is apparent in the
efforts of OCZM, by delaying the state's grant, to induce the State of
Washington to implement state coastal zone policies in the adjacent lands
area. Severe reductions in federal CZM funding, unless replaced through
OCS revenue-sharing or some other source, could make such OCZM
coastal state disputes moot. Nevertheless, some states might view the
benefits of the federal consistency obligation as a sufficient incentive to
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maintain federal program approval. Coastal states with federally approved
coastal programs and local governments within those states are just now
beginning to perceive and receive the benefits of the federal consistency
obligation. Unlike federal funds for coastal management which are distributed relatively evenly and widely, the benefits of federal consistency
tend to be distributed unevenly, both temporally and geographically.
The fact that the West Coast programs are now in place or nearly so
does not mean they have been entirely successful in achieving the ambitious goals set for them. A large share of their costs of program formulation and development already have been incurred. Operating costs
will, of course, continue, but should decline over time as developers, the
public, and other users adjust to new expectations about permissible uses
of the coastal zone. Conversely, the larger share of the benefits will accrue
in the future.
Washington and Oregon were the first states to obtain federal approval;
all three West Coast states have adopted innovative and comprehensive
coastal zone programs. The three states are used as models by other
states. The successes and failures of these programs may be especially
meaningful as a measure of the overall achievements of CZM. It is
important, however, to remember that the real test of these programs lies
in the future. The significant impact these programs have had in improving
coastal zone management in the three states over the past ten years raises
legitimate expectations for their future success. New ideas or policy
developments, however, are not likely to occur in this field for a number
of years. The concept of CZM was novel and dynamic in the 1960s and
1970s, but has now become an established part of the legal and administrative scenery of the West Coast states. The future is more likely to
see efforts aimed at implementation, refinement, and defense of existing
programs. Management of the economic, legal, and political effects of
the existing programs and exportation of key concepts to other maritime
nations will loom larger in the future.
It is unlikely that monitoring problems will be solved by any strikingly
new institutional measures. If federal funding diminishes as expected,
then state and federal agencies will withdraw further from their enforcement oversight activities. Program administration will be increasingly left
to local governments, as has been the case in land use planning. Thus,
successful enforcement of state-level policies, such as priority for waterdependent development, increasingly will depend on the knowledge,
awareness, and efforts of private and public interest organizations and on
the attitude of the judiciary.

